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ABSTRACT 
Like the chorus in Shakespeare’s Henry the Fifth, those who proceed 
on behalf of society at large should have both the first and last word. They 
should possess the capacity to undertake this act of representation, 
whether in or out of court, with forcefulness and finality. Indeed, a 
genuine representative should not have to run the risk of others thereafter 
embarking upon the matter anew and standing in for whomever she is 
representing, as well as casting aside her effort as irrelevant, insufficient, 
or illegitimate. 
Therefore, a societal settlement, particularly when negotiated by the 
authorities, may have not only contractual but also procedural (or 
preclusive) implications, which (partly independently of intent) shield the 
contractors from litigation as well as liability. To that end, it may or may 
not, depending on the jurisdiction, require the judiciary’s endorsement in 
order to constitute the functional equivalent of a judgment. U.S. and civil-
law principles of preclusion bar a subsequent suit insofar as it involves the 
same real party in interest (namely, the whole citizenry) and assertion (or 
cause and object) as its amicably averted antecedent counterpart. 
Judges and lawmakers in the United States, as well as Latin America, 
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have invariably conceded these actions an erga omnes effect; in other 
words, against anyone with standing who might try to reignite the 
controversy. Settlers in these cases normally neither compromise on the 
underlying entitlements nor contract on the rights of someone else. In fact, 
they may and should vindicate these entitlements fully and facilitate the 
collective conciliation of claims based on collectivity’s own rights. The 
government, for its part, enjoys plenty of legitimacy to play this role and to 
settle on, as well as prosecute, these entitlements. 
In these disputes, the settling or suing actor steps into the shoes of the 
broader community. The latter, as the interested claimant, may not 
subsequently take another bite at the apple through a different 
spokesperson. Otherwise, it would unfairly and inefficiently burden, 
respectively, its opponents and the adjudicating tribunals in its quest for a 
windfall. Consequently, the trans-individual settlements and suits at stake 
should strengthen, rather than weaken, from a punctilious adherence to 
the requirements of res judicata. They should thereby further legitimate 
themselves and perhaps even solidify the political and social support from 
which they benefit. 
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O, pardon! since a crooked figure may 
Attest in little place a million; 
And let us, ciphers to this great accompt, 
On your imaginary forces work. 
 
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, 
THE LIFE OF KING HENRY THE FIFTH, 
act 1, prologue 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Like the chorus in Shakespeare’s Henry the Fifth,1 those who proceed 
on behalf of society at large should have both the first and last word. They 
should possess the capacity to undertake this act of representation, whether 
in or out of court, with forcefulness and finality. Indeed, a genuine 
representative should not have to run the risk of others thereafter 
embarking upon the matter anew and standing in for whomever she is 
representing, as well as casting aside her effort as irrelevant, insufficient, 
or illegitimate. 
This Article will imagine the state as such a nominal claimant and 
specifically study the preclusive ramifications, in the United States and 
throughout the Western Hemisphere, of a judicially endorsed 
governmental conciliation of a societal claim. It will conclude that such an 
agreement, like the settled or averted action, precludes other, prospective 
plaintiffs from litigating the cause. Coincidentally, some civil-law 
jurisdictions do not require the judiciary to sign off to produce this 
outcome. 
The overall conclusion at the heart of the preceding paragraph rests on 
the notion that the settler or suitor in these disputes steps into the shoes of 
the broader community. The latter, as the real party in interest, may not 
subsequently take another bite at the apple through a different 
spokesperson. Otherwise, it would unfairly and inefficiently burden, 
respectively, its opponents and the adjudicating tribunals in its quest for a 
windfall. As a result, such settlements or suits would lose much of their 
legitimacy and perhaps also their political and social support. 
In any event, the conciliatory option plays a key role in the effort to 
vindicate environmental and other entitlements that pertain to the citizenry 
as a whole. Specifically, it allows such vindication in an abundant number 
 
 
1  See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE LIFE OF KING HENRY THE FIFTH, act 1, prologue; see also 
id. act 5, epilogue. 
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of cases that could not realistically go through a potentially protracted and 
pricey adjudication. Of course, the law must not merely authorize parties 
to settle and to secure any necessary judicial endorsement. It must 
additionally guarantee a full res judicata effect thereupon. After all, 
alleged violators would have much less of an incentive to conciliate if they 
could not thereby attain protection against fundamentally identical 
complaints that other complainants might lodge. 
Part I will (A) define the various types of rights at stake and (B) 
describe a hypothetical scenario to which the analysis will refer from start 
to finish. Next, Part II will explore the discussed agreements’ contractual 
and procedural implications. Part III will then consider the latter. In 
particular, it will separately scrutinize how U.S. law and its civil-law 
counterpart should decide the question of res judicata under their 
respective standards. 
Afterward, Part IV will examine how legal systems in the United States 
and throughout Latin America tackle the issue in practice. It will show that 
they recognize, mostly explicitly, an erga omnes impact; in other words, 
against anyone who might try to reignite the controversy. Finally, Parts V 
and VI will assess, in turn, the theoretical challenges confronting and the 
justifications underlying (V) an authorized litigant’s endeavor to settle 
these collective claims and (VI) the government’s defense of the public’s 
well-being. 
Beyond taking stock of the entire disquisition, the Conclusion will 
submit that, independently of who acts as nominal claimant, such suits and 
settlements operate more legitimately when they punctiliously stay within 
the limits set by the principles of preclusion. It will propose that they may 
thus better survive any generalized attempt to discard them as superfluous 
or frivolous. At the end of the day, the speaker for the people will have the 
chance to speak, both figuratively and literally, once and for all. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Nomenclature 
This Section will explicate societal rights. It will contrast them with 
aggregated individual rights, as well as with individual rights. Further 
elaboration on this conceptual framework will take place in the course of 
the argumentation in full. 
The law, the precedents, and the literature deploy different terms to 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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refer to these various entitlements.2 Nonetheless, they largely agree on the 
underlying issues.3 This Article relies on a terminology that brings to the 
fore, as clearly as possible, the difference between the distinct varieties of 
entitlements under examination. At any rate, it uses the words ‘right’ and 
‘entitlement’ mostly interchangeably. 
Individualized rights are the most basic element in this categorical 
scheme. They support claims that one person asserts against someone else. 
For instance, P may, under usual circumstances, rightfully insist on 
indemnification, on the basis of individual entitlements, when she endures 
personal injury as a consequence of D’s negligence.4  
Two or more parties may sometimes combine their respective 
individual assertions in a single action, if they can show sufficient legal or 
factual commonality to warrant the combination.5 The rights in question 
do not thereby lose their individualized character. For example, P1 and P2 
may institute their complaints and vindicate their entitlements together 
whenever D injures both of them at once through her negligent conduct.6 
They should receive compensation commensurate with what they are 
individually entitled to. 
As the number of right-holders increases, the denomination 
‘aggregated individual rights’ becomes appropriate. Still, the numerous 
entitlements generally remain individual and amenable to apportionment. 
For instance, when a substantial set of stockholders sues the corporate 
board of directors for encroaching upon shareholder rights, each investor 
usually has a claim that corresponds to the quantity of shares that she 
owns.7 
 
 
2  See infra Part IV (“Different procedural mechanisms exist for the vindication of these group 
entitlements [throughout the Americas].”). 
3  See infra Part IV (“[The various] Western Hemisphere . . . jurisdictions that allow societal-
rights litigation [exhibit a] convergence in approach.”). 
4  See, e.g., Simmons v. Himmelreich, 136 S.Ct. 1843, 1846 n.2 (2016) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 
1346(b)) (“The precise claims at issue are ‘claims against the United States, for money damages, . . . 
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or 
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or 
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the 
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.’”). 
5  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1) (“Persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if: (A) they 
assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the 
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or 
fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.”). 
6  See, e.g., United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 45 (2005) (“In this case, two injured mine 
workers (and a spouse) have sued the United States claiming that the negligence of federal mine 
inspectors helped bring about a serious accident at an Arizona mine.”). 
7  See, e.g., Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 30 (2011) (“Respondents, 
plaintiffs in a securities fraud class action, allege that petitioners, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., and three of 
its executives (collectively Matrixx), failed to disclose reports of a possible link between its leading 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss1/5
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These individually held entitlements, which allow division, stand out in 
sharp relief against societal rights, which are basically indivisible and 
concern society as a unit, or a sizeable community. This ampler category 
includes generalized entitlements that have attained national or 
international recognition, such as rights to ecological well-being, to the 
safeguard of public health or cultural heritage, to self-determination, or to 
economic development.8 These particular entitlements have developed 
more recently than individual rights.9 Furthermore, they often operate as 
positive rights, which compel the government (or private parties) 
positively to engage in, rather than negatively to refrain from, certain 
actions.10 
Rights that belong indivisibly to several persons have, most likely, 
existed in all legal systems and at all times. When two individuals own a 
house, for example, they normally possess a relatively undividable right 
with respect to it. Likewise, entitlements that pertain to society at large 
have had an extremely extended history. The Roman actio popularis, for 
instance, enabled ordinary citizens to uphold the entitlements of the entire 
citizenry.11 The novelty of the contemporary action of this sort consists in 
its general, as opposed to sporadic, availability, in its widespread 
deployment, and in its focus on modern concerns such as the 
environment.12 The U.S. citizen suit and the civil-law action on so-called 
“diffuse” interests provide cases in point.13 
For purposes of illustration, one may think of a privately-run prison 
 
 
product, a cold remedy, and loss of smell, rendering statements made by Matrixx misleading.”). 
8  See, e.g., African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 16, adopted on June 
27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (“Right to Health”); id. art. 20 (“Right to 
Self-Determination”); id. art. 22 (“Right to Economic, Social and Cultural Development”); id. art. 24 
(“Right to a General Satisfactory Environment”). 
9  See, e.g., ÁNGEL R. OQUENDO, LATIN AMERICAN LAW 382 (2017) (“Since the attainment of 
independence in the nineteenth century, constitutions in Latin America have guaranteed negative 
rights. . . . Latin American nations have been incorporating positive rights into their constitutional 
charters since the beginning of the twentieth century.”). 
10  See, e.g., African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People’s Rights, supra note 8, art. 16(2) 
(“State Parties to the present Charter shall take the necessary measures to protect the health of their 
people and to ensure that they receive medical attention when they are sick.”); id. art. 20(3) (“All 
peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the State Parties to the present Charter in their 
liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it political, economic or cultural.”); id. art. 22(2) 
(“States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to 
development.”). 
11  See generally DIG. 47.23.0-8 (“De popularibus actionibus”). 
12  See infra Part VI (“[M]any jurisdictions in the Western Hemisphere have been gravitating 
toward authorizing . . . not . . . narrowly tailored private-law actions but rather . . . broadly based 
public-law suits.”). 
13  See infra Sections IV.B.2 and IV.D.1. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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that neglects security regulations and thus compromises the safety of the 
immediate vicinity. The neighbors who, as a result, see their home values 
drop might join their individualized claims against the institution and 
demand satisfaction for the reduction in the price of their homes. In 
addition to this joinder of individual assertions, the surrounding 
neighborhood might seek to enforce its right to a safe residential space and 
request a judicial order commanding incarceration officials to abide by the 
relevant rules. 
In societal litigation, the entitlement at stake transcends any personal 
entitlement that the neighboring residents might enjoy. Indeed, it cannot 
be apportioned (or divided) among them in a straightforward fashion. An 
injunction issued against the responsible authorities, for the protection of 
this right, benefits the group but no person in particular. 
In fact, the violation would occur even if none of the properties had 
depreciated. After all, the population, as a totality, has suffered a separate 
harm—beyond the financial loss that homeowners have individually 
borne—due to the overall diminution in quality of life. The individual 
entitlements relate to but also distinctly differ from their collective 
counterpart. 
While both types of rights can be vindicated “collectively,” there are 
two elemental dissimilarities between aggregated-individual and societal 
entitlements. First, the former are readily divisible, whereas the latter are 
not. Second, the two kinds of rights diverge in their range of application: 
typically, grouped individual entitlements concern a circumscribed, though 
potentially vast, number of persons, while societal entitlements pertain to 
the polity in its entirety. 
In light of their divisibility, such aggregable individual rights permit 
individualized or collectivized enforcement; either by the interested parties 
themselves or through a representative, respectively. In contradistinction, 
societal entitlements necessitate joint vindication by means of 
representation. The members of the broader society could not enforce their 
“part” because the right would withstand no easy partition. The person 
representing them must vindicate the entitlement in the name of the 
collectivity, which constitutes the real party in interest. 
The state performs a primordial part in the enforcement of these meta-
individual entitlements.14 It accordingly upholds rights that stand in 
opposition to its own contractual, proprietary, or pecuniary rights.15 For 
example, the authorities may stake, on the one hand, a “public” claim 
 
 
14  See generally infra Part VI. 
15  See infra Part VI. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss1/5
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against a food-processing company for delivering unhealthy products to 
the population and, on the other hand, a “private” assertion for damages 
against a transportation business when one of its vehicles negligently 
crashes into a governmental building. In the first case, the government 
enforces entitlements that belong to the populace as a whole. In the 
second, it vindicates entitlements that it holds in its own right as a legal 
entity. 
Consequently, the state predominates in this enforcement effort. 
Nevertheless, scores of jurisdictions in the Western Hemisphere have 
started empowering individuals and organizations to take on a comparable 
representative role.16 In the United States, people have been filing class, as 
well as qui tam, actions for very long and citizen suits since somewhat 
more lately.17 In Continental Europe and Latin America, the expression 
“diffuse rights” has emerged along with an equivalent empowerment to 
distinguish such entitlements from others that a person may enforce, 
namely, personal rights.18 
In many countries, either the legislative or the judicial branch has 
defined the res judicata repercussions of the prosecution of an action by 
one representative on similar suits that others might subsequently lodge.19 
It has invariably determined or implied that a final decision on the merits 
in one case precludes other would-be representatives from initiating a new 
complaint.20 This consensus undoubtedly rests on the idea that the initial 
judgment binds the citizenry itself, regardless of who may be acting on its 
behalf.21 
Moreover, a number of legal regimes establish that a settlement, 
whether on collective or individual entitlements, itself produces the same 
preclusive effect as the action that it averted.22 In contrast, others require 
parties to submit it to a tribunal for validation before it may forestall any 
future litigation.23 In any event, when the government settles a societal suit 
and secures any necessary court endorsement, it bars subsequent suitors to 
 
 
16  See generally infra Part IV. 
17  See infra Sections IV.B.1-2; see also infra Section IV.A (“The U.S. legal order. . . empowers 
individuals to vindicate [societal rights] through citizen suits or qui tam actions [as well as] class 
actions . . . .”). 
18  See infra Sections IV.C-D; see also infra Section IV.A (“Brazil . . . has been considerably 
active in this area [and] Spanish America . . . has opened up, somewhat more freshly, to the 
enforcement of so-called diffuse entitlements.”). 
19  See generally infra Part IV. 
20  See generally infra Part IV. 
21  See infra Section III.D. 
22  See generally infra Part II. 
23  See infra Part II. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the same extent it would by prosecuting the action.24 
The discussion will draw on the articulated nomenclature in assessing 
the impact of a qualifying conciliation on a later lawsuit on the same 
matter. It will conclude, inter alia, that preclusion will ensue so long as 
both controversies involve, on the claimant’s side, the same genuinely 
interested party—to wit, the community which experienced the 
encroachment—as well as the same claim. Hence, individuals with 
standing will face dismissal if they launch an essentially identical 
complaint afterward. They may then only vindicate their own 
interconnected individual entitlements, if any. 
B. Hypothetical 
As already announced, this Article analyzes the res judicata 
consequences of a settlement on societal rights.25 To that end, it will now 
hypothesize a controversy between a particular community and a violator 
of communal entitlements. The parties end up reaching an agreement that 
enables them to avoid litigation. 
More concretely, the state, speaking in the name of its citizens, finds 
out that a paint manufacturer has contaminated a public lake nearby. It 
first threatens to sue, then negotiates, and ultimately settles in a 
comprehensive manner. Accordingly, both sides sign a contract that 
releases the wrongdoer from all public claims on the matter in exchange 
for a cleanup and monetary compensation. They do not address any harm 
that individuals might have suffered. 
Furthermore, the conciliation precludes subsequent suits without any 
further formalities. In other words, it has benefited from any necessary 
judicial endorsement. As previously mentioned and explained in due 
course, some jurisdictions require such a court approval, but others do 
not.26 
The next step in this exercise in imagination consists in envisaging 
someone subsequently lodging a complaint against the manufacturing 
company in pursuit of identical, additional, or alternative redress for the 
same injury. She would probably prosecute either a citizen suit in the 
United States or a diffuse-interests action in the civil-law universe.27 In 
 
 
24  See infra Part VI (“In the [upcoming] hypothetical, the state specifically enforces the 
community’s environmental right against any violations attributable to the manufacturer. Upon 
conciliating and procuring any requisite judicial endorsement, it legally and legitimately binds itself 
and anyone else trying to uphold the entitlement against the same encroachments.”). 
25  See supra Introduction and Section I.A. 
26  See supra Section I.B and infra Part II. 
27  See infra Sections IV.B.2, IV.C.1, and IV.D1-3. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss1/5
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any event, the defendant thereafter pleads for dismissal on grounds of 
preclusion. 
The discussion will determine whether the judge should grant the 
motion. It will conclude that she should. After all, the two disputes 
coincide not only on their underlying claim but also on the real party in 
interest at the receiving end, namely, the society as a whole. The fact that 
they differ in the representative acting on behalf of the collectivity should 
not affect the analysis. 
II. CONTRACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL IMPLICATIONS 
The agreement conciliating the environmental conflict hypothetically at 
hand may have both contractual and procedural repercussions. First, it 
may contractually commit the polluter to a cleanup and compensation, 
while providing relief from responsibility in any action seeking 
remediation for the collective injury inflicted. Second, the instrument may 
procedurally produce, under the law, the same preclusive impact as the 
avoided lawsuit would upon a no-longer-appealable judgment. 
In the United States, the judiciary generally treats these agreements as 
regular contracts. Hence, it regards them as obligating each contractor so 
long as they fulfill all formal and substantive requirements. “A settlement 
is a contract,” according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, “and its enforceability is governed by familiar principles of 
contract law.”28 
Furthermore, if the settlers secure judicial approval, the document will 
lead to res judicata ramifications equivalent to those of a conclusive 
adjudication on substance. In the articulation of the Third Circuit: 
“Judicially approved settlement agreements are considered final judgments 
on the merits for the purposes of claim preclusion.”29 The First Circuit 
expounded this notion in Langton v. Hogan: 
When a dispute of law exists between parties to a case and they 
agree to a settlement of that dispute and entry of a judgment with 
prejudice based on that settlement, then the terms of that judgment 
in relation to that legal issue are subject to res judicata principles. A 
judgment that is entered with prejudice under the terms of a 
settlement, whether by stipulated dismissal, a consent judgment, or 
a confession of judgment, is not subject to collateral attack by a 
 
 
28  Knudsen v. Comm'r, 793 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2015). 
29  Toscano v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 288 F. App’x 36, 38 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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party or a person in privity, and it bars a second suit on the same 
claim or cause of action.30 
The panel went on to declare: “The resolution of the legal dispute by 
consent judgment is . . . binding on the parties to the case in which the 
consent judgment is entered.”31 
Likewise, Latin American and Continental European civil codes 
invariably recognize the contractual nature of an agreement that settles 
actual or possible litigation.32 “A settlement,” under Article 2044 of 
France’s Civil Code, “is a contract through which the parties terminate or 
prevent a controversy by means of reciprocal concessions.”33 Presumably, 
it obliges one side to renounce the right to litigate in exchange for the 
opponent’s fulfillment of an allegedly neglected obligation. 
Interestingly, many civil-law jurisdictions additionally attribute direct 
adjective consequences to these agreements. Under the original 
formulation of Article 2052 of the French Civil Code, for example: 
“Settlements produce the effect, among the parties, of res judicata at a 
court of last resort.”34 Consequently, they do not necessitate adjudicative 
ratification to hinder later litigation on an essentially identical claim. Other 
countries within the tradition adopt an analogous approach.35 
Still, some nations in Latin America and Continental Europe tackle the 
question differently, namely along the lines of the United States. For 
instance, Brazil’s 2003 Civil Code omitted its predecessor’s provision 
imparting an immediate preclusive impact to an agreement conciliating a 
 
 
30  Langton v. Hogan, 71 F.3d 930, 935 (1st Cir. 1995). 
31  Id. 
32  See, e.g., CÓDIGO CIVIL [CD. CIV.] art. 2446 (Chile) (“La transacción es un contrato en que 
las partes terminan extrajudicialmente un litigio pendiente, o precaven un litigio eventual.”); CD. CIV. 
art. 2348 (Ecuador) (same); CD. CIV. art. 2000 (Hond.) (same); CD. CIV. art. 2192 (El Sal.) (same); 
CD. CIV. art. 1709 (P.R.) (“La transacción es un contrato por el cual las partes, dando, prometiendo o 
reteniendo cada una alguna cosa, evitan la provocación de un pleito o ponen término al que había 
comenzado.”); CD. CIV. art. 1809 (Spain) (same). 
33  CODE CIVIL [CD. CIV.] art. 2044 (Fr.) (“La transaction est un contrat par lequel les parties, 
par des concessions réciproques, terminent une contestation née, ou préviennent une contestation à 
naître.”); see also BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] § 779(1) (Ger.) (“Begriff des 
Vergleichs. . .”) (Ein Vergleich ist ein “Vertrag, durch den der Streit oder die Ungewißheit der 
Parteien über ein Rechtsverhältnis im Wege gegenseitigen Nachgebens beseitigt wird.”). 
34  CD. CIV. art. 2052 (Fr.) (1804) (“Les transactions ont, entre les parties, l'autorité de la chose 
jugée en dernier ressort.”). The current rendering sounds somewhat similar: “A settlement constitutes 
an obstacle to the introduction or pursuit of an action, with the same object, between the parties.” CD. 
CIV. art. 2052 (Fr.) (“La transaction fait obstacle à l'introduction ou à la poursuite entre les parties 
d'une action en justice ayant le même objet.”). 
35  See, e.g., CD. CIV. art. 2460 (Chile) (“La transacción produce el efecto de cosa juzgada en 
última instancia. . . .”); CD. CIV. art. 2014 (Hond.) (same); CD. CIV. art. 2206 (El Sal.) (same); CD. 
CIV. art. 1715 (P.R.) (“La transacción tiene para las partes la autoridad de la cosa juzgada . . . .”); CD. 
CIV. art. 1816 (Spain) (same). 
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legal quarrel.36 Pursuant to Article 515(III) of the 2015 Brazilian Code of 
Civil Procedure, such a contract becomes an “executable title” only if 
endorsed by the bench.37 Germany approaches the matter comparably.38 
Irrespective of whether this endorsement prerequisite applies, one must 
first examine the res judicata implications of (1) a firm ruling in the 
averted lawsuit in order to ascertain those of (2) a qualifying conciliation. 
If the former operates erga omnes—in other words, against anyone who 
might embark upon the same representation afterward—so does the latter. 
Therefore, the inquiry must focus on the ultimate resolution that would 
have issued from the litigation that the settlers set aside. 
Of course, two mano-a-mano signatories to a settlement will normally 
pursue, respectively, the satisfaction and the protection that a final 
decision on the merits would have afforded them. In particular, they will 
typically accede to reparations and releases as wide-ranging as the 
recovery and prospective immunity they would attain upon judicial 
intervention. For this reason, the contractual and procedural consequences 
of the instrument will overlap considerably. Nonetheless, they will also 
diverge in some significant regards. 
For example, the contractual effect rides primarily on the intent of the 
contractors. It boils down to the result or outcome that they were aiming 
at. In contrast, the formal impact does not strictly hinge on what the 
potential plaintiff and defendant who ultimately conciliated their dispute 
wanted or were striving for. In this respect, the conciliation resembles a 
tribunal’s definitive determination, which may bind the litigants regardless 
of whether they ever contemplated this possibility. 
More fundamentally, the contractual and the procedural consequences 
differ in kind. On the one hand, the settlers may invoke the agreement in 
any subsequent suit in order to prevail on the substance. On the other 
hand, they may rely on it as the functional equivalent of a judgment, plead 
res judicata, and spare themselves the trial altogether. Thus, the 
contractual upshot is a shield against liability; its adjective counterpart is a 
 
 
36  Compare CD. CIV. art. 1030 (Braz.) (1917) (“A transação produz entre as partes o efeito de 
coisa julgada.”), with CD. CIV. arts. 840-50 (Braz.). 
37  See, e.g., CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [CD. PRO. CIV.] art. 515(III) (Braz.) (“São títulos 
executivos judiciais . . . a decisão homologatória de autocomposição extrajudicial de qualquer 
natureza.”). 
38  See, e.g., ZIVILPROZEßORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] § 794(1.1) (Ger.) 
(“Weitere Vollstreckungstitel”) (“Die Zwangsvollstreckung findet ferner statt aus Vergleichen, die 
zwischen den Parteien oder zwischen einer Partei und einem Dritten zur Beilegung des Rechtsstreits 
seinem ganzen Umfang nach oder in Betreff eines Teiles des Streitgegenstandes vor einem deutschen 
Gericht . . . .”). 
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safeguard against litigation in the first place. 
Depending on whether she benefits from preclusion, someone who has 
conciliated may either exclusively oppose an attempt to hold her liable on 
the affair or actually refuse to litigate to begin with. In the first situation, 
she would have to respond substantively to an adversary challenging the 
deal reached as, say, unconscionable. In the second, she could maintain 
her refusal even against an allegation of error on the basis of the prior 
trier’s failure to acknowledge that unconscionability. She could insist on 
the recognition of his substantive pronouncement insofar as he possessed 
jurisdiction and legitimacy. She could reject any request to revisit his 
findings on grounds of mistake however gross. In a legal system that does 
not require juridical intercession, she could arguably assume a similar 
stance by pointing out that the parties enjoyed full capacity, information, 
and autonomy when they amicably solved their disagreement. 
In the hypothetical, the governmental conciliation will contractually 
forbid ensuing private actions solely to the extent that the signatories 
specifically so intended and contracted. It will procedurally preclude such 
suits if, partly independently of the contractors’ intentions and the 
contractual text, the litigation that it ended or obviated would have done as 
much. Moreover, the judge adjudicating the complaint should pass on (1) 
the contract as part of, and (2) the preclusive effect prior to, the merits. 
Accordingly, she would ordinarily rule against the complainant further 
into the proceedings in the former scenario than in the latter. 
III. PRECLUSIVE-IMPACT ANALYSIS 
 A. Overview 
As just stressed, qualifying settlements produce the preclusive 
consequences of a final decision on the merits in the lawsuit that they help 
prevent.39 In order to determine whether they preclude a subsequently 
instituted complaint, one must decide whether the potential action that the 
parties originally avoided would have itself constituted, upon a conclusive 
substantive adjudication, res judicata vis-à-vis its subsequent, actual 
counterparts. The discussion will now assess the latter issue from the 
perspective of the common- and civil-law traditions, particularly as 
developed in the United States and Latin America, respectively. 
 
B. Under U.S. Law 
 
 
39  See supra Part II. 
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In the United States, the judiciary has established that preclusion rides 
on a first and second litigation coinciding in their litigants and causes of 
action. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has formulated 
the basic guidelines: 
For the doctrine of res judicata to be applicable, there must be: (1) a 
final judgment on the merits in a prior suit; (2) an identity of the 
cause of action in both the earlier and the later suit; and (3) an 
identity of parties or their privies in the two suits.40 
Zeroing on the last two conditions, the Supreme Court has declared: 
“Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit 
bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the 
same cause of action.”41 It has expressly deployed these precepts in the 
context of collective litigation: “A judgment in favor of the plaintiff class 
extinguishes their claim, which merges into the judgment granting relief. 
A judgment in favor of the defendant extinguishes the claim, barring a 
subsequent action on that claim.”42 
In the hypothetical, the avoided lawsuit and its actually filed 
counterpart oppose the same defending and complaining parties in interest: 
to wit, the contaminator and the concerned community. The fact that the 
authorities undertook the representation of the latter the first time around 
and a citizen suitor subsequently does not matter. The analysis should 
concentrate on the represented collectivity rather than on the person 
playing the representative role.43 Otherwise, it would allow the assertion of 
a claim over and over again by a formidable number of different claimants 
with standing to sue.44 
Analogously, when a mother stands in at trial for her child, the final 
decision has a preclusive effect in relation to the latter, not the former. 
Hence, it precludes the father from similarly serving as spokesperson 
thereafter. In order to ascertain whether a single suitor brought the two 
suits, one would have to focus not on the parents but, instead, on the 
offspring on whose behalf they are speaking.45 Regarding the hypothetical 
 
 
40  Pueschel v. United States, 369 F.3d 345, 354-55 (4th Cir. 2004). 
41  Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979). 
42  Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984). 
43  See generally infra Section III.D. 
44  See infra Section III.D. 
45  See, e.g., Armstrong v. Armstrong, 544 P.2d 941, 946 (Cal. 1976) (“In the present case, 
plaintiffs’ mother was entrusted with their care and custody and was a proper representative of their 
interests. [Moreover,] the record before us discloses no . . . circumstances [of subordination of the 
child’s future interests to the present interests and advantages of a parent]. For this reason, we 
conclude that plaintiffs are bound by the judgment in the divorce action to which their mother was a 
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supra-individual complaint, the focus should correspondingly fall upon the 
ultimately interested society, not the nominal complainant. 
As to the cause of action, tribunals have associated the concept with the 
relevant underlying facts or issues. For instance, the Ninth Circuit has 
stated that a substantively and conclusively adjudicated action impedes 
subsequent litigation if “[b]oth claims present[] the same parties, the same 
facts, and the same issues.”46 The Seventh Circuit has, in turn, employed 
the term “core of operative facts.” It has held that “[r]es judicata” is 
“properly applied” when “two suits involve[] the same parties and core of 
operative facts.”47 
The Fifth Circuit has engaged in its own reflection on what the 
convergence in cause of action should amount to: 
Various tests have been advanced to determine whether the 
substance of two actions is the same for Res judicata purposes: Is 
the same right infringed by the same wrong? Would a different 
judgment obtained in the second action impair rights under the first 
judgment? Would the same evidence sustain both judgments? [T]he 
principal test for comparing causes of action is whether the primary 
right and duty or wrong are the same in each action.48 
This approach would require a determination that the two lawsuits turn on 
identical rights, duties, and wrongs. 
Afterward, this very court pivoted to an alternate take. It branded “the 
transactional test . . . enunciated by the Restatement [(Second) of 
Judgments]” the “modern view” and expressed preference for it.49 From 
this outlook, the “claim . . . embrace[s] all the remedial rights of the 
plaintiff against the defendant growing out of the relevant transaction (or 
series of connected transactions).”50 
The hypothesized controversies would meet any of these standards. 
They would both concern a single cause of action: a violation of a 
 
 
party.”); Covington v. Anthony, 128 P.2d 1012, 1014-15 (Okla. 1942) (“[A previous] action by [the 
minor plaintiff] Pauline Covington [was prosecuted] by her father as next friend. Throughout the 
opinion reference is made to the plaintiff, plaintiff's injury, plaintiff's contributory negligence, etc. This 
alone is sufficient to destroy the force of the argument now made in the present case, [filed by the 
mother,] that the action was not by plaintiff, and that she was not the party in interest, and discloses 
that this court considered the matter, and held Pauline Covington to be the real party in interest. . . . 
The [prior] final judgment of this court was conclusive, not only as to the issues litigated, but likewise 
as to matters which were germane to the issues which might have been litigated therein.”). 
46  England v. Berryhill, 696 F. App’x. 288, 289 (9th Cir. 2017) (memorandum opinion). 
47  Barr v. Bd. of Trs. of W. Ill. Univ., 796 F.3d 837, 838 (7th Cir. 2015). 
48  Kemp v. Birmingham News Co., 608 F.2d 1049, 1052 (5th Cir. 1979). 
49 Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556, 560 n.4 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1982)). 
50 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1982)). 
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communal entitlement calling for redress. The complaint lodged would 
specifically allege a “core of operative facts,” “right,” “duty,” “wrong,” 
and “series of connected transactions” indistinguishable from those at the 
basis of the antecedent conciliation. It would likewise rest on the factual 
allegation that the paint manufacturer contaminated a public lake, on the 
group entitlement to a clean environment, on the private sector’s duty to 
prevent and clean up any contamination generated, and on the offense of 
illegally causing ecological damage. Under these circumstances, the 
original violator could use the judicially endorsed settlement to ward off 
litigation on the matter, as well as to escape liability. 
C. In the Civil-Law World 
1. Prelude 
The civil-law world takes a more formal approach but ultimately 
arrives at a similar conclusion. Rather typically, the French Civil Code 
embraces the principle of preclusion and specifies the criteria of 
application. Article 1351 reads as follows: “Res judicata applies only to 
what has been the object of a judgment. The thing demanded must be the 
same. The demand must rest on the same cause, involve the same parties, 
and be formulated by them or against them on the same basis.”51 This 
provision sets forth the triad of requirements through which many 
jurisdictions in Latin America,52 as well as Continental Europe,53 decide 
the issue of the preclusive implications of one suit for another. It requires, 
in other words, an identification of (1) parties, (2) object, and (3) cause. 
The discussion will now consider the three elements, which are 
“traditionally referred to as . . . the three identities.”54 It will conclude that 
the litigation that the hypothetical conciliation averted and the 
 
 
51  CD. CIV. art. 1355 (Fr.) (“L’autorité de la chose jugée n’a lieu qu’à l’égard de ce qui a fait 
l’objet du jugement. Il faut que la chose demandée soit la même; que la demande soit fondée sur la 
même cause; que la demande soit entre les mêmes parties, et formée par elles et contre elles en la 
même qualité.”). 
52  See, e.g., CÓDIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO CIVIL [CD. PRO. CIV.] art. 177 (Chile) (“La excepción 
de cosa juzgada puede alegarse . . . siempre que entre la nueva demanda y la anteriormente resuelta 
haya: 1. Identidad legal de personas; 2. Identidad de la cosa pedida; y 3. Identidad de la causa de 
pedir.”); L. 15982 (1988), CÓDIGO GENERAL DEL PROCESO [CD. GEN. PRO.] art. 219 (Uru.) (“La cosa 
juzgada, obtenida en proceso contencioso, tendrá efecto en todo proceso entre las mismas partes 
siempre que versare sobre el mismo objeto y se fundare en la misma causa.”). 
53  See, e.g., CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [CD. PRO. CIV.] art. 581(1) (Port.) (“Repete-se a causa 
quando se propõe uma ação idêntica a outra quanto aos sujeitos, ao pedido e à causa de pedir.”). 
54  EDUARDO J. COUTURE, FUNDAMENTOS DEL DERECHO PROCESAL CIVIL 414 (§ 270) (3d ed. 
1958). 
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subsequently instituted action converge on their parties, object, and cause. 
Hence, the agreement should preclude the suit from this standpoint. 
2. Parties 
The two hypothesized controversies must involve the same violator for 
preclusion to apply in the civil-law realm,55 as well as in its common-law 
counterpart.56 Furthermore, they must likewise intersect with respect to the 
identity of the ultimate claimant,57 that is, the community that suffered an 
encroachment upon its right to live in a wholesome environment. Of 
course, the litigants may trade places without affecting the assessment.58 
According to Eduardo J. Couture, even when “the plaintiff in the first 
action acts as defendant in the second and vice versa; the change in 
position makes no difference for purposes of res judicata.”59 
Once again, the fact that the representatives of the concerned 
collectivity differ in the two disputes bears no relevance to the issue under 
examination. “The requirement of identity between the parties,” as 
Couture observes, “obviously refers not to physical but rather to legal 
identity.”60 Accordingly, one should zero in on the real party in interest, 
namely, the injured population, not on the individuals or entities that are 
representing it. 
Couture explicates the underlying idea: 
The principle of representation holds . . . in all those cases in which 
the law confers upon a legal subject procedural standing to proceed 
at trial in the interest and defense of another. . . . In these cases, the 
judgment pronounced against the representative binds the 
represented party . . . .61 
 
 
55  Id. at 423 (§ 276) (“[L]a cosa juzgada alcanza a quienes han sido partes en el juicio . . . .”). 
56  See generally supra Section III.B. 
57  See generally COUTURE, supra note 54, at 423 (§ 276) (“[L]a cosa juzgada alcanza a quienes 
han sido partes en el juicio . . . .”). 
58  For example, the hypothetical violator, now as plaintiff rather than as potential defendant, 
might sue the community, which the state represents, for a declaratory judgment invalidating the 
settlement. Cf. Covington v. Anthony, 128 P.2d 1012, 1015 (Okla. 1942) (“Assume [that] this court, in 
case No. 29213, had affirmed the judgment [for the plaintiff] and the defendant had refused to satisfy 
same, but had filed suit to enjoin levying of execution upon his property. . . . Could it be 
conscientiously urged that any court would have the jurisdiction to enjoin the execution? The answer is 
obvious.”). 
59  COUTURE, supra note 54, at 423 (§ 276). 
60  Id. at 424-25 (§ 276) (“El problema de la identidad de partes no se refiere, como se ve, a la 
identidad física, sino a su identidad jurídica.”). 
61  Id. at 424 (§ 276) (“El principio de representación rige . . . en todos aquellos casos en que la 
ley confiere a un sujeto de derecho la legitimación procesal para actuar en juicio en interés y defensa 
de otro. . . . En esos casos, la cosa juzgada dada contra el representante alcanza al representado, sin 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss1/5
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The representation under consideration may take place either by virtue 
of a specific authorization for the case at hand or generally by force of 
law.62 As an instance of the first scenario, someone may, through a written 
instrument, explicitly entrust the assertion of her claim to another person.63 
As examples of the second scenario, a statute may empower parents to 
vindicate the entitlements of their children,64 or (particularly pertinently) 
any citizen those of the citizenry as a whole.65 
In sum, the identities of the representatives who led the original and the 
succeeding effort in the hypothetical do not matter for the present inquiry. 
Preclusion analysis must instead consider the represented party, which was 
one and the same in each: to wit, the society at large. Inasmuch as the 
government in the original settlement and the complainants in the 
subsequent suit were both acting in the name of that interested party 
against the same polluter, the two controversies meet the identity-of-
parties criterion. 
3. Object 
According to Eduardo J. Couture, “‘object’ normally refers to the 
tangible or intangible good that the litigation pursues: the corpus, in 
actions that concern tangible goods; . . . in general, the good sought, in 
actions that involve rights to intangibles.”66 All in all, it means the “legal 
good”67 or benefit that the complainants are demanding. 
The object relates to, but does not boil down to,68 the entitlement that 
supports the complaint. In an ordinary contractual dispute, for instance, the 
suitor exercises the right to have the agreement honored. She may pray for 
the defendant either to perform on the contract or to indemnify as two 
different, though equivalent, forms of the same bargained-for benefit, 
 
 
perjuicio de las acciones de responsabilidad que pudieran surgir entre ambos.”). 
62  See, e.g., L. 15982 (1988), CD. GEN. PRO. art. 36.1 (Uru.). 
63  See, e.g., id. arts. 36.1, 40. 
64  See, e.g., CD. CIV. art. 162 (Spain) (“Los padres que ostenten la patria potestad tienen la 
representación legal de sus hijos menores no emancipados.”). 
65  See generally infra Part IV. 
66  COUTURE, supra note 54, at 432 (§ 281) (“Por objeto se entiende, normalmente, el bien 
corporal o incorporal que se reclama en juicio: el corpus en las acciones que se refieren a bienes 
corporales; . . . en general el bien que se ansía, en las acciones que versan sobre derechos 
incorporales.”). 
67  Id. at 433 (§ 282) (“bien jurídico”). 
68  See id. (“No se trata, en nuestro concepto, del derecho que se reclama. . . . Dentro del 
concepto de identidad de objeto (eadem res) no es necesario hacer interferir el derecho que lo protege, 
porque cuando se trata de determinar cuál es el bien garantido por la ley, los elementos objetivos de la 
acción se desdoblan: el objeto por un lado y la causa por otro.”). 
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which basically consists in his making good on his promise. Accordingly, 
a pair of suits upon a single breach for specific performance and for 
damages, respectively, would objectively overlap, so to speak. 
In societal-rights cases, the object similarly depends on the entitlement 
at stake. The latter demarcates the former inasmuch as it defines the legal 
good that the representative may ask for on behalf of the collectivity. 
Multiple controversies of this sort objectively converge when the 
complaining member in each requests identical or comparable remedies 
for the group on the basis of the same right. 
The litigation that the hypothetical governmental conciliation averted 
would have pressed for environmental reparation or compensation in an 
attempt to uphold the communal right to live in a healthy environment. 
The subsequent complaint has an indistinguishable object. Furthermore, it 
invokes, against the same factual background, the same entitlement. In the 
final analysis, the two claimants were and are trying, respectively, to 
vindicate a collective right against the inflicted ecological harm. 
4.  Cause 
Eduardo J. Couture provides a definition of the third res-judicata 
requirement too. He declares that “‘cause’ refers to the immediate 
foundation of the right that the plaintiff is exercising. It denominates the 
reason underlying the prior litigation’s claim.”69 “The case law,” he 
explains, “has repeatedly embraced the scholarly idea that the causa 
petendi is the reason that supports the claim or the immediate foundation 
of the right invoked in the litigation.”70 
The Latin expression “causa petendi” simply means the cause for 
petitioning or the justification for the request. The concept encompasses 
the (1) facts of the case, as well as (2) the legal grounds that back up the 
claim. In this sense, two suits intersect in their cause when they coincide 
with respect to this duo of elements. 
Thus, causa petendi squarely rests, through its second component, on 
the entitlement at stake in the dispute. It derives not “only from the factual 
antecedents” but also from “the right itself,”71 according to José Alfonso 
 
 
69  Id. at 432 (§ 281) (“Por causa se entiende el fundamento inmediato del derecho que se ejerce. 
Es la razón de la pretensión aducida en el juicio anterior.”). 
70  Id. at 435 (§ 283) (“La jurisprudencia ha acogido reiteradamente la idea de la doctrina de que 
la causa petendi es la razón de la pretensión o sea el fundamento inmediato del derecho deducido en 
juicio.”). 
71  JOSÉ ALFONSO TROYA CEVALLOS, ELEMENTOS DE DERECHO PROCESAL 555 (Quito: Centro 
de Publicaciones Pontificia U. Católica Ecuador) (2d ed. 1978) (on file with author) (“antecedentes de 
hecho”) (“el mismo derecho”). 
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Troya Cevallos. The cause of an action for contractual breach, for 
instance, hinges factually on the existence of a contract, as well as the 
occurrence of a violation, and legally on the corresponding entitlement to 
compel the defendant to repair, or compensate for, the inflicted harm. It 
sustains the object, namely, the requested reparation or compensation. 
The causal element transcends the grounds focused on by the person 
filing the suit. It additionally comprises any other ones upon which she 
could or should have relied. Couture expounds this idea: “The foundation 
of the right adjudicated is not merely that invoked by the complainant. It is 
that of the right that applies to the matter and must be sought by the judge 
beyond the parties’ allegations.”72 In terms of an equivalent example, the 
cause might include what the contract explicitly and implicitly entitled the 
suitor to, even if she concentrated solely on the former. She would 
ordinarily not be able to relitigate based on the latter after a definitive 
defeat on the merits the first time around. 
As already ascertained, the lawsuit that the governmental settlement 
hypothetically prevented would have enforced the same group entitlement 
that the subsequent complaint purports to vindicate: the right to live in an 
environment free from contamination.73 Moreover, it would have adduced 
the same facts, i.e., the ecological damage that took place as a result of the 
violator’s activities. Consequently, both controversies converge in their 
causa petendi. 
Interestingly, many scholars analyze the object and cause together. In 
the words of Couture, “it is always very difficult to speak about identity of 
object without considering the causa petendi that justified the demand in 
the previous adjudication.”74 “Therefore,” he adds, “the principle of the 
identity of object can hardly be decoupled from that of identity of cause.”75 
In combining the two, which in combination capture what the claimant is 
claiming, the civil-law tradition approximates its common-law 
counterpart, which tends to zero in solely on the claim, in addition to the 
parties.76 
5. Coda 
The application of these ordinary res judicata criteria, which many 
 
 
72  COUTURE, supra note 54, at 435 (§ 283); see also id. (“Por eso se admite sistemáticamente, 
que una variante en el planteamiento jurídico no excluye la excepción de cosa juzgada.”). 
73  Id. 
74  COUTURE, supra note 54, at 434 (§ 282). 
75 Id. 
76 See, e.g., supra Section III.B. 
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civil-law jurisdictions share,77 would establish that the action that the 
authorities hypothetically averted by conciliating precludes the complaint. 
The former and the latter coincide in their parties, object, and cause. In 
legal systems that do not require judicial endorsement, the conciliation 
itself would have the same preclusive impact as a judgment subject to no 
further appeal or collateral attack. In those that do impose such a 
requirement, it would depend on the court’s blessing to become the 
functional equivalent of a final decision on the merits. 
D. The Idea of Res Judicata 
Throughout the Americas, the adjudication of a societal action binds 
the concerned community and thwarts any other person from herself 
proceeding on the controversy afterward.78 In other words, it leads to res 
judicata erga omnes, i.e., with respect to all or anyone who might 
subsequently undertake the representation. Part IV will corroborate these 
contentions.79 
In fact, to maintain that the ultimate resolution under these 
circumstances does not bring about such preclusion would amount to 
saying that, for all practical purposes, it does not have a preclusive effect 
at all. Upon the vindication of the collective entitlement by one 
representative, for instance, millions of other citizens could engage in the 
same representation and relitigate the cause all over again. Each bite at the 
apple would scarcely reduce the opportunities to bite anew: exactly by one 
out of the total number of the population. In the end, enforcement would 
unfold in a dysfunctional and iniquitous fashion. 
This approach would thoroughly undermine the notion of res judicata 
precisely because it would defeat two crucial associated aspirations: 
efficiency and due process. Duly contextualized, the former necessitates 
that courts have the capacity to decide a case once and for all and to reject, 
ab initio, any iteration thereof. Correlatively, the latter calls on the 
judiciary to shield defendants from having to confront and perhaps satisfy 
a single claim repeatedly. The inability of a societal judgment to preclude 
subsequent suits on point would spell bad news on both fronts. Tribunals 
and defending parties would face not the possibility of a single suitor 
refiling her complaint but rather the Kafkaesque prospect of a succession 
of litigants reiterating the action. 
In this scenario, the lawsuit lodged at the outset, just like its 
 
 
77 See supra Section III.C.1. 
78 See generally infra Part IV. 
79 See infra Part IV. 
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supervening reincarnations, would hardly constitute an act of 
representation. In order to act as a genuine representative, one must 
possess the authority to bind, in a definitive manner, whomever one is 
representing, over against any future endeavor to stand in for her regarding 
identical issues. If another complainant, let alone a long array of 
candidates, may readily rehash the matter, no real representation ever takes 
place. The situation would resemble that of a multiplicity of agents 
pretending to speak for a movie star, each simultaneously negotiating 
different contracts on her behalf but ultimately lacking the power to 
commit her to anything. 
Common-law adjudicators may invoke the doctrine of res judicata to 
forestall this predicament. They may accordingly dismiss any new 
litigation insofar as it involves the same principally interested party—
irrespective of who might be assuming the representation—and cause of 
action.80 Ordinary civil-law rules of preclusion, as formerly fleshed out, 
afford judges an analogous way out.81 Concretely, the original vindication 
would bar another suit if both overlapped in their (1) real parties in 
interest, independently of who might be representing, (2) object, and (3) 
cause.82 
As indicated before, jurisdictions in the Western Hemisphere with a 
completely developed societal-rights regime in place explicitly or 
implicitly recognize that the vindication of such entitlements produces an 
erga omnes preclusive impact.83 This fact should not come as a surprise in 
light of the mentioned criteria, as well as ideals, of res judicata and in view 
of the concept of representation. One can barely envisage a legal system 
that would purposely resolve the issue differently. 
In the hypothetical, the filer of the suit is seeking to advance a 
communal interest, to represent a group, to uphold a collective entitlement, 
and to stake a claim along the lines of the government’s earlier effort. She 
should fail on grounds of res judicata. As a result of the settlement, the 
state only left her the right to sue on her personal losses. 
Of course, the application of the principle of preclusion would deprive 
the plaintiff of no substantive entitlement. First and foremost, the public 
right at stake belongs not to her but rather to the public itself. Further, the 
authorities did not extinguish this entitlement. They actually vindicated it. 
Juan Carlos Larrea Valencia articulates the primary position in 
 
 
80  See, e.g., supra Section III.B. 
81  See supra Section III.C. 
82  See generally supra Section III.C. 
83  See generally infra Part IV. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
24 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 18:1 
 
 
 
reference to unconstitutionality actions, a special type of societal suit. He 
argues as follows: 
In unconstitutionality actions, there are no interested parties. No 
individual interests, which would demand protection in the context 
of similar claims in the future, exist. “These suits entail not an 
individual but rather a general interest, pertaining to civil society 
and to the state, in the preservation of the Constitution’s 
supremacy.”84 
In collective environmental actions, the interest at issue likewise 
pertains to the society as a unit, not to any person in particular. Upon an 
initial suit and especially upon a vindication of the entitlement in question, 
anyone who tries to reignite the dispute cannot legitimately complain 
about the ensuing preclusive ban. 
Such a claimant could not even validly protest about losing her right 
procedurally to stand in for the people. Procedural entitlements of 
representation are intimately intertwined with their substantive 
counterparts. The former in the absence of the latter are not merely empty; 
in reality, they evanesce completely. 
Upon a mother’s enforcement of a child’s right in the previous 
example,85 the father no longer possesses an entitlement to assert the 
claim. After all, he does not himself hold the underlying right. His 
daughter does, and she fully exercised it beforehand through her mother. 
Analogously, societal representatives do not sue on their own 
entitlement but rather on that of the populace in its entirety. They simply 
have the right to speak in the name of the latter so long as nobody else has 
done so. If someone already has, however, the entitlement does not lie 
anymore. 
Significantly, the adjective right of representation in this sort of 
litigation disappears due to the normal operation of the rules of procedure, 
not to any arbitrary governmental acts. It does not entitle the holder to 
represent, much less to re-represent, the polity despite any applicable 
 
 
84  Juan Carlos Larrea Valencia, Cuestiones de Derecho Constitucional, Administrativo y 
Tributario, 22 REVISTA JURÍDICA: FACULTAD DE JURISPRUDENCIA Y CIENCIAS SOCIALES Y POLÍTICAS 
DE LA UNIVERSIDAD CATÓLICA DE SANTIAGO DE GUAYAQUIL 19, 21 (July 26, 2007) (on file with 
author) (quoting Hernán Rivadeneira Játiva, Acción de inconstitucionalidad de las normas jurídicas, in 
LA JUSTICIA CONSTITUCIONAL EN LA ACTUALIDAD 229, 241 (Corporación Editora Nacional) (Luis 
López Guerra, ed., 2002)) (“En el ejercicio de la acción de inconstitucionalidad no hay partes 
interesadas, no existe, por consiguiente, un interés particular al que se deba proteger respecto de 
pretensiones futuras similares: ‘Esta acción no implica un interés particular, sino uno general, de la 
sociedad civil y el Estado, para preservar la supremacía constitucional.’ . . .”). 
85  See supra Sections III.B and III.C.2. 
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formal strictures. Obviously, the parameters of preclusion, along with the 
correlated commitment to efficiency and due process, continue to apply. 
And they require finality upon a prior decision on the merits. 
IV. PRECLUSION IN PRACTICE 
A. Warm-Up 
For purposes of res judicata, two societal actions involve the same 
complaining party when their respective nominal plaintiff represents a 
single real party in interest—namely, the larger collectivity. The first may 
preclude the second if both converge on the matter in contention. 
Likewise, it may bar any subsequent such suit. Specifically, the state may, 
upon enforcing public entitlements, impede private persons or entities 
from reasserting the claim. 
This Part will show that, in the Western Hemisphere, jurisdictions that 
allow societal litigation embrace these principles. It will start with the 
United States, whose legal system has had much experience in this kind of 
adjudication. The discussion will then turn to Brazil, which has been 
considerably active in this area in the last couple of decades. It will finally 
concentrate on Spanish America, which has opened up, somewhat more 
freshly, to the enforcement of so-called diffuse entitlements. 
The convergence in approach should not come as a surprise. After all, 
the ancient Roman popular action already followed the pattern. Title 23 of 
Book 47 of the Justinian Code, Corpus Juris Civilis, which deals with such 
suit, proclaims: “If an action is repeatedly brought on the same cause and 
on the same fact, the ordinary exception of res judicata may be raised.”86 
In other words, a preclusive ban will apply to any re-litigation attempt—in 
all likelihood regardless of who acts as complainant. 
In any event, a thoroughly adjudicated societal complaint has an erga 
omnes effect throughout the Americas. Any other result would run counter 
to the rules of preclusion that prevail in the common-law and civil-law 
traditions.87 In addition, it would undermine the very notion of 
representative litigation, lead to uncertainty and inefficiency, and visit 
 
 
86  DIG. 47.23.3 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 1) (“Sed si ex eadem causa saepius agatur [agetur], cum 
idem factum sit, exceptio vulgaris rei iudicatae opponitur.”) “If a particular matter had been disposed 
of in a popular action, the respondent in a subsequent action based upon the same cause of action could 
plead res judicata.” Johan D. van der Vyver, Actiones Populares and the Problem of Standing in 
Roman, Roman-Dutch, South African and American Law, 1978 ACTA JURIDICA 191, 192 (1978). 
87  See, e.g., supra Sections III.B-C. 
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fundamental unfairness upon the defendant.88 
Different procedural mechanisms exist for the vindication of these 
group entitlements. The U.S. legal order, for instance, empowers 
individuals to vindicate the latter through citizen suits or qui tam actions. 
Latin American law, in turn, authorizes private persons or organizations to 
safeguard these rights through popular actions or diffuse-interests suits. 
Some procedures, such as the class action in the United States, the Spanish 
American collective writ of protection (amparo colectivo), and the 
Brazilian public civil action, serve to vindicate aggregated individual as 
well as societal rights. 
Of course, the authorities may also uphold the latter entitlements 
through adjective devices other than administrative suits. In the United 
States, they may rely on parens patriae suits. In Brazil, the state may 
institute public civil actions. In Spanish America, it may prosecute diffuse-
interests suits or popular actions. As previously suggested, all of these 
suits, like those lodged by individuals, produce an erga omnes preclusive 
impact. 
B. The United States 
1. Class Actions 
In the United States, class suits may involve entitlements that 
indivisibly pertain to society at large or to an outsized subgroup. In 
particular, they may unfold under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) 
and pray for “injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief” against 
someone who “has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally 
to the class.”89 For example, the plaintiffs may proceed in the name of the 
citizenry against a real-estate developer whose activities endanger an 
important national monument. 
A final decision on the merits has a preclusive effect upon re-litigation 
by other class members. In the words of the U.S. Supreme Court: 
There is of course no dispute that under elementary principles of 
prior adjudication a judgment in a properly entertained class action 
is binding on class members in any subsequent litigation . . . . Basic 
principles of res judicata (merger and bar or claim preclusion) and 
collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) apply.90 
 
 
88  See generally supra Section III.D. 
89  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
90  Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984). 
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When the initial petition alleges a violation of rights that belong to an 
extensive group, such as through “a general pattern or practice of 
discrimination,” a firm ruling precludes the class members from lodging 
another complaint on the basis of similar allegations, even though it does 
not stand in the way of prosecuting “individual claims.”91 
Significantly, class members ordinarily may not opt out in suits 
certified under Rule 23(b)(2); solely in those under Rule 23(b)(3) for the 
vindication of aggregated individualized entitlements. The latter provision, 
applicable to proceedings in which “the court finds that the questions of 
law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to 
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy,”92 necessitates notification “to class members [informing 
them] that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests 
exclusion.”93 In contrast, Rule 23(b)(2) imposes no such requirement.94 It 
merely invites “the court [to] direct [any] appropriate notice to the class.”95 
“A class action under Rule 23(b)(2),” according to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, “is referred to as a ‘mandatory’ class action 
because class members do not have an automatic right to notice or a right 
to opt out of the class. . . . Because homogeneity is required, unitary 
adjudication of the claims is feasible without the devices of notice and opt-
out.”96 In actuality, the adjudicator normally rules on a genuinely 
collective entitlement, binds the collectivity as a whole, and does not allow 
members to bail out with the option to litigate anew afterward. 
Invariably, these suits not only include but also preclude everyone who 
might otherwise possess standing. Inasmuch as they concern a community 
as the real party in interest, they hinder all of its members from suing 
again. The larger the group at issue, the more one might tend to use a term 
such as ‘erga omnes’ to describe the res judicata consequences. 
2. Citizen Suits and Qui Tam Actions 
 
 
91  Id. at 880. 
92  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
93  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v). 
94  Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 n.14 (1974) (“[T]he notice requirements of 
subdivision (c)(2) . . . are applicable to class actions maintained under subdivision (b)(3). By its terms, 
subdivision (c)(2) is inapplicable to class actions for injunctive or declaratory relief maintained under 
subdivision (b)(2).”). 
95  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A). 
96  Romberio v. UNUMProvident Corp., 385 F. App’x 423, 432 (6th Cir. 2009). 
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In the United States, some federal statutes authorize citizen suits, which 
enable personally affected complainants to advance the public’s 
environmental and other interests through litigation.97 Similarly, qui tam 
actions empower anybody to challenge conduct that injures the polity as a 
whole, such as the submission of “false claims.”98 Both procedures, in 
essence, allow the initiating petitioner to enforce a statutorily defined set 
of societal rights. 
When someone lodges a citizen suit, she may bar other potential suitors 
from litigating the same matter later on. Harold Krent and Ethan 
Shenkman proffer the following justification for this outcome: 
Citizen suits could have a res judicata effect under the theory that 
plaintiffs acting in the capacity of private attorneys general are in privity 
with other plaintiffs acting in the same capacity. Otherwise, defendants 
might be subject to an unlimited number of citizen suits for the same 
violations . . . .99 
Perhaps the issue seldom crops up because the Supreme Court has 
compelled claimants to focus on their own “injury in fact” and thereby 
distinguish their complaint from that of any predecessor.100 Naturally, they 
may altogether renounce all generalized assertions in order to avoid 
running against a preclusive ban. 
Analogously, a final decision on the merits in a qui tam action 
constitutes res judicata vis-à-vis any subsequent attempt, even if 
undertaken by a different nominal litigant, to stake the same claim. The 
 
 
97 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2018); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 
(2018); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2018); Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) 
(2018). 
98  See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2018).  
Qui tam is short for the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte 
sequitur, which means “who pursues this action on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as his 
own.” The phrase dates from at least the time of Blackstone. See 3 W. Blackstone, 
Commentaries *160. Three other qui tam statutes, all also enacted over 100 years ago, remain 
on the books. See 25 U.S.C. § 81 (providing cause of action and share of recovery against a 
person contracting with Indians in an unlawful manner); § 201 (providing cause of action and 
share of recovery against a person violating Indian protection laws); 35 U.S.C. § 292(b) 
(providing cause of action and share of recovery against a person falsely marking patented 
articles); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 962 (providing for forfeiture to informer of share of vessels privately 
armed against friendly nations, but not expressly authorizing suit by informer); 46 U.S.C. 
§ 723 (providing for forfeiture to informer of share of vessels removing undersea treasure 
from the Florida coast to foreign nations, but not expressly authorizing suit by informer). 
Vermont Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1 (2000). 
99  Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizens Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91 MICH. L. 
REV. 1793, 1814 n.79 (1993). 
100 Luján v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“[T]he plaintiff must have 
suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is . . . concrete and 
particularized.”); see also id., at 560 n.1 (“By particularized, we mean that the injury must affect the 
plaintiff in a personal and individual way.”). 
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U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota has traced William 
Blackstone’s explanation of this result: 
The res judicata effect of a qui tam action was explained by Mr. 
Blackstone who stated, “But if any one hath begun a qui tam or 
popular action, no other person can pursue it; and the verdict passed 
upon the defendant in the first suit is a bar to all others, and 
conclusive even to the king himself.” 101 
Hence, the original, definitively adjudicated action precludes any other 
one prosecuted thereafter, whether by the authorities or anyone else. 
These preclusion principles apply identically to these suits when the 
state launches the initial action. Upon suing someone under the False 
Claims Act for filing a fraudulent demand for payment,102 the U.S. 
government legally prevents other complainants from concurrently 
proceeding on the same grounds.103 Upon securing a definitive 
determination, it blocks private parties from subsequently restarting the 
dispute.104 
3. Parens Patriae Suits 
If authorities in the United States lodge a parens patriae suit to further 
the citizenry’s entitlements, they bind anyone who might otherwise 
possess standing to sue to the same end. “When a state litigates common 
public rights,” the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has 
enunciated, “the citizens of that state are represented in such litigation by 
the state and are bound by the judgment.”105 The tribunal explained that 
“plaintiffs are not barred on their private claims,” which the governmental 
administration “could not have asserted . . . in its parens patriae 
 
 
101 See United States ex rel. Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Gambler’s Supply, 925 F. Supp. 658, 667-
68 (1996) (citing Miami Copper Co. v. State, 149 P. 758, 761 (Ariz. 1915)). 
102 See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729-3733 (2018). 
103 Id. § 3730(e)(3) (“In no event may a person bring an action . . . which is based upon 
allegations or transactions which are the subject of a civil suit or an administrative civil money penalty 
proceeding in which the Government is already a party.”). 
104 Subsequent individual claims would be barred in virtue of res judicata principles, as well as 
of the statutory ban on actions “based upon the public disclosure of allegations . . . in a criminal, civil, 
or administrative hearing in which the Government or its agent is a party.” Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A). A 
court will view the original governmental suit as the “public disclosure” and will dismiss, unless the 
plaintiff is “an original source of the information.” Id. 
105 Satsky v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 1470 (10th Cir. 1993). The Second 
Circuit quotes this language with approval in New York v. Reebok Int’l, 96 F.3d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(“Satsky correctly states the rule applicable in these cases”). 
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capacity”106 under the relevant statute, to wit, the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).107 
However, claims based on injuries to the natural resources held by 
the State . . . are barred by the [previous] consent decree. . . . If the 
claims are for injuries to interests which all citizens hold in 
common, and for which the State has already recovered, the 
judgment . . . acts as a bar.108 
Presumably, the conclusion would not have changed if the President of 
the United States, who also may, pursuant to the statutory text, “act on 
behalf of the public as trustee of . . . natural resources,”109 had instituted 
the original complaint. 
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. 
Exxon Corp. reads: “State governments may act in their parens patriae 
capacity as representatives for all their citizens in a suit to recover 
damages for injury to a sovereign interest. . . . There is a presumption that 
the state will adequately represent the position of its citizens.”110 The 
panel, thereupon, concluded that “the United States and the state of Alaska 
. . . in their capacities as ‘trustees for the public’” under CERCLA and the 
Clean Water Act (CWA) bound the entire population when they judicially 
settled collective-harm claims against the defendant for the 1989 Exxon 
Valdez oil massive leak.111 It pointed out that “the [complainant] 
sportfishers . . . as members of the public, were ‘parties’ to the [initial] 
federal suit within the meaning of res judicata” and “were in privity with 
[the] . . . governments, as members of the public.”112 
This appellate opinion affirms the district court’s dismissal on grounds 
of preclusion and, in particular, the determination that the recreational 
association and its associates “failed to allege private claims”113 and that 
their public assertions were precluded by the authorities’ court-approved 
 
 
106 Satsky, 7 F.3d at 1469. The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized “the right of a State to 
sue as parens patriae to prevent or repair harm to its ‘quasi-sovereign’ interests.” Hawaii v. Standard 
Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 258 (1972). 
107 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2018). “The State could not have recovered under either CERCLA 
or the parens patriae doctrine for injuries to Plaintiffs’ private interests.” Satsky, 7 F.3d at 1470. “To 
the extent these claims involve injuries to purely private interests, which the State cannot raise, then 
the claims are not barred. By ‘purely private interests,’ we mean claims that the State has no standing 
to raise.” Id. 
108 Satsky, 7 F.3d at 1470. The judges note in their opinion that “the State has recovered for 
injuries to the natural resources.” Id. 
109 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (2018). 
110 34 F.3d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). 
111 Id. at 771. 
112 Id. at 773-74. 
113 Id. at 772. 
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conciliation. In addition, the trial judge had summarily ruled against the 
“National Wildlife Federation (NWF) and several other environmental 
groups . . . who, [like the fishermen,] sought to establish a conservation 
fund to remedy ecosystem damage caused by the spill.”114 Both sets of 
claimants confronted a preclusive ban because they purported to proceed 
on the same alleged breach of communal entitlements as the federal and 
state administrations had earlier, and because they otherwise declined to 
demand reparation for their own, individualized, personal losses. 
Finally, the Eighth Circuit went even further in its pronouncements in 
United States EPA v. Green Forest.115 “In this case,” it declared, “we are 
faced squarely with the question whether citizens’ claims brought prior to 
a government action are properly dismissed when a consent decree is 
entered in a later-filed EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] action.”116 
The judges did not hesitate: “Recognizing the preeminent role that 
government actions must play in the CWA [Clean Water Act] enforcement 
scheme, we hold that they are.”117 Hence, the administration may foil 
citizen suits even when it launches its own complaint after their institution. 
These controversies show how, in societal litigation, different nominal 
filers standing in for the same real party in interest—to wit, the broader 
community with its specific array of indivisible entitlements—share an 
identity for purposes of res judicata. In parens patriae actions, one litigant 
may generally ban others from subsequently prosecuting the cause again. 
These precedents specifically call to mind the hypothetical inasmuch as 
they present a situation in which the authorities hamper individuals from 
pressing comparable collective claims afterward, though not from staking 
individual assertions. 
4. Summation 
In the United States, a nominal suitor can preclude someone else 
subsequently purporting to assert the same societal claim—whether 
through a class action, citizen suit, qui tam action, or parens patriae 
action. Notwithstanding the fact that the two complainants differ, the 
main, real party in interest does not change from one suit to the next. 
Accordingly, res judicata holds. In particular, when the government 
enforces communal rights through a parens patriae or “False Claims” 
 
 
114 Id. at 771. 
115 921 F.2d 1394 (8th Cir. 1990). 
116 Id. at 1403. 
117 Id. 
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action, it bars private plaintiffs from refiling the cause. 
C. Brazil 
1. Popular Actions 
Brazil, which has shown itself most receptive to group adjudication, 
also bans subsequent litigation by other representatives after the ultimate 
resolution of a dispute on a societal entitlement. This restriction applies, 
for instance, to popular actions, which enable “[a]ny citizen to annul either 
acts harmful to public property or state action that impinges upon the 
principle of administrative integrity, upon the environment, or upon 
historical or cultural goods.”118 Significantly, the authorities possess no 
standing. In any event, the 1965 law that introduces this procedural device 
declares: “The judgment shall constitute res judicata, erga omnes, except 
in cases of dismissal for insufficiency of proof.”119 
When judges dismiss upon determining that the plaintiff’s evidence 
does not suffice because, for instance, it fails to include a key document, 
they do so without prejudice. The same person, or a different one, may sue 
anew and try to prove her complaint to the full extent.120 This exception 
bears no relevance to the hypothetical, however, since the original 
controversy involved a fulfilled, rather than rejected, claim and raised no 
issue of evidentiary inadequacy. 
Therefore, a final decision on the merits precludes anyone else from 
relitigating the cause. “In other words, if an individual subsequently 
institutes another popular action, she will face dismissal on the basis of res 
judicata.”121 This preclusive effect takes place irrespective of the sort of 
suit subsequently relied upon. 
These Brazilian suits provide yet another example of one nominal party 
preventing another one from enforcing a collective right on the same facts 
later on. The absence of personal identity presents no problem. So long as 
both complainants act in representation of the society at large on the 
matter in contention, the first to proceed bars the second. 
2. Public Civil Actions 
 
 
118 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [CONST.] art. 5(LXXIII) (Braz.), translated and reprinted in 
OQUENDO, supra note 9, at 860 (italics omitted). 
119 L. 4717 art. 18 (Braz.) (1965), translated and reprinted in OQUENDO, supra note 9, at 861. 
120 See id. (“Whenever this exception applies, any citizen may file another action on the same 
grounds and introduce new evidence.”). 
121 OQUENDO, supra note 9, at 861-62 (italics omitted). 
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Brazil’s Constitution empowers the Public Ministry, an autonomous 
state institution, to prosecute “public civil actions to protect public and 
social property, the environment, and other diffuse and collective 
interests.”122 The injuries at stake concern, to a great extent, societal 
entitlements. The relevant statute grants standing to governmental entities 
and private associations but not to individuals.123 
The statutory preclusion principles reproduce those applicable to 
popular actions almost exactly. “The judgment,” hence, “shall [generally] 
constitute res judicata, erga omnes.”124 It thus bars subsequent suits by any 
one of the parties who could otherwise sue. 
Article 16 differs from its counterpart in the Popular Actions Act 
merely insofar as it restricts the preclusive impact to “the jurisdictional 
limits of the issuing court.”125 Consequently, if a state trial-judge in Bahia 
rules against a company for discriminating against Afro-Brazilians, the 
ruling would not bind the defendant elsewhere. In Minas Gerais, a plaintiff 
would have to launch a new complaint in order to stop the enterprise from 
engaging in comparable practices there. Of course, a tribunal with 
jurisdiction over the entire national territory—such as the Brazilian 
Supreme Court—could enter or affirm the original resolution, which might 
then effectively amount to res judicata throughout the country. Afterward, 
no one else could commence a public civil action or another type of suit, 
like a popular action, in the name of the same collectivity and on the same 
matter. 
Article 103 of Brazil’s Consumer Code—which addresses “diffuse 
interests or rights, which are trans-individual, as well as indivisible, and 
pertain to an indeterminate group of people linked by common issues of 
fact”126—adds a supplemental set of preclusion rules to those defined in 
the Public Civil Actions Act.127 It establishes, once again, that a “judgment 
. . . shall have the following res judicata effect: erga omnes . . . .”128 The 
provision clarifies, however, that the substantive rejection of a claim based 
on these entitlements does not “impair the individual interests and rights of 
 
 
122 CONST. art. 129(III) (Braz.), translated and reprinted in OQUENDO, supra note 9, at 900. 
123 L. 7347 art. 5 (Braz.) (1985), translated and reprinted in OQUENDO, supra note 9, at 901. 
124 Id. art. 16 (italics omitted). 
125 Id. 
126 L. 8078 art. 81 (Braz.) (1990), translated and reprinted in OQUENDO, supra note 9, at 904. 
127 Compare translated and reprinted in OQUENDO, supra note 9, at 901, with L. 8078, CÓDIGO 
DO CONSUMIDOR [CD. CONSUM.] art. 103 (Braz.) (1990), translated and reprinted in OQUENDO, supra 
note 9, at 918-19. 
128 L. 8078, CD. CONSUM. art. 103(I) (Braz.) (1990), translated and reprinted in OQUENDO, 
supra note 9, at 918 (italics omitted). 
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the members of the collectivity . . . .”129 As a result, an individually injured 
person may subsequently file a fresh complaint on her own behalf. 
Nonetheless, the final decision does preclude any future collective suit that 
authorized suitors might seek to institute. 
3. Summation 
Brazilian law takes two societal-rights suits to involve the same 
plaintiff, for purposes of res judicata, when the respective representatives 
represent the same real party in interest. In popular or public civil actions, 
a nominal suitor who enforces group entitlements thereby bars any other 
complainant who might try to embark upon the same representation later 
on. Significantly, a public civil action can give rise to a situation very 
similar to the hypothetical whenever the state originally sues on collective 
claims and thereby precludes any other potential litigant from staking 
them all over again. Of course, the authorities do not thus in any way 
prevent claimants from subsequently vindicating different, individual 
assertions. 
D. Spanish America 
1. Diffuse-Interests Suits in Peru and Uruguay 
The Uruguayan legal system provides for a “diffuse-interests” suit, 
which resembles the Brazilian public civil action.130 Article 42 of 
Uruguay’s General Procedural Code defines this device: 
The Public Ministry and any interested individual, in addition to 
public-interest institutions or associations that, according to the law 
or to the court’s appreciation, adequately represent the interests at 
stake, shall have standing in cases involving the defense of the 
environment, as well as cultural or historical values that are shared 
by an indeterminate group of people.131 
This provision, as opposed to its Brazilian counterpart, empowers 
“interested individuals,” along with the Public Ministry and associations, 
to take the initiative.132 At any rate, it limits the category of actionable 
injurious acts. It focuses exclusively on safeguarding “the environment, as 
 
 
129 Id. art. 103(1) (Braz.), translated and reprinted in OQUENDO, supra note 9, at 918. 
130 L. 15982, CD. GEN. PRO. art. 42 (Uru.) (1988), translated and reprinted in OQUENDO, supra 
note 9, at 927. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
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well as cultural or historical values that are shared by an indeterminate 
group of people.”133 
Article 220 of the same codification specifies the applicable principles 
of preclusion: “In suits filed in defense of diffuse interests (Art. 42), the 
judgment shall have a general effect, except in the event of dismissal for 
lack of proof. When this exception applies, any other individual with 
standing may relitigate the matter.”134 A firm ruling on the merits, not 
amounting to “dismissal for lack of proof,”135 keeps other litigants from 
suing again. As in the hypothetical, the authorities, upon pursuing the 
action to its ultimate consequences and upon presenting sufficient 
evidence, block individuals or organizations from prosecuting the dispute 
afterward. 
In Peru, Article 82 of the Code of Civil Procedure also establishes a 
functional equivalent to the Brazilian public civil action. 
Interests are diffuse when they are held by an indeterminate number 
of people and attach to goods of incalculable [pecuniary] value, 
such as the environment, as well as cultural, historical, and 
consumer goods or values. 
The Public Ministry, as well as nonprofit associations or institutions 
that have standing by statute or by virtue of a duly grounded 
determination by the judge, may file or intervene in these actions.136 
Hence, the lawsuit may concern collective “goods” of any sort so long as 
they possess “incalculable [pecuniary] value.”137 
The provision concludes with the following sentence: “A final 
judgment upholding the complaint shall additionally bind [those] who 
have not participated in the proceedings.”138 Oddly enough, the enactment 
does not spell out the res-judicata implications of a rejection of the cause. 
Still, it clearly endorses the notion that, upon securing a favorable ultimate 
resolution, the state forestalls subsequent litigation by any other statutorily 
authorized party. 
Individuals may not commence a diffuse-interests suit in Peru. 
 
 
133 Id. 
134 Id. art. 220. 
135 Id. Once again, the lack-of-proof exception does not apply to the case at hand. See supra 
Section IV.C.1. 
136 CÓDIGO PROCESAL CIVIL art. 82 (Peru), translated and reprinted in OQUENDO, supra note 9, 
at 928. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
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Nonetheless, they may proceed under Article 40 of the Code of 
Constitutional Procedure, if the entitlements at issue have “constitutional 
stature.”139 This provision states, specifically, that “any person may file for 
a writ of protection when a threat to or a violation of environmental or 
other diffuse rights that have constitutional stature is at stake; so may non-
profit organizations whose purpose is the defense of the rights in 
question.”140 “The judgment,” the Peruvian Constitutional Court has 
proclaimed, “will have an effect on ‘all other members of the collectivity 
who find themselves in a situation identical to that of the person who 
brought the action in the first place.’ Consequently, the preclusive effect 
of the decision transcends the individual or group that filed the 
complaint.”141 
In a nutshell, the Uruguayan and the Peruvian diffuse-interests suits 
may preclude anyone who might subsequently institute any kind of 
complaint on the same claim. They thus bear a resemblance to U.S. class 
actions, citizen suits, qui tam actions, and parens patriae suits, as well as 
to Brazilian popular and public civil actions. In Uruguay and Peru, the 
state may enforce societal entitlements through the Public Ministry and 
thereby bar others seeking to litigate the controversy anew by whatever 
adjective means. Of course, such an outcome calls to mind that of the 
hypothesized case. 
2. Colombian Popular Actions 
Colombia’s Law 472 of 1998 purports to carry out constitutional 
Article 88’s mandate “to regulate popular actions,”142 which afford a 
“procedural means for the protection of collective rights and interests.”143 
 
 
139 L. 28237, CÓDIGO DE PROCESO CONSTITUCIONAL art. 40 (Peru) (2004). 
140 Id. (“Asimismo, puede interponer demanda de amparo cualquier persona cuando se trate de 
amenaza o violación del derecho al medio ambiente u otros derechos difusos que gocen de 
reconocimiento constitucional, así como las entidades sin fines de lucro cuyo objeto sea la defensa de 
los referidos derechos.”). 
141 Tribunal Constitucional [Trib. Const.], Sept. 4, 2009, [Lovón Ruiz-Caro v. Minis. Rel. Ext.], 
Exp. No. 05287-2008-PA/TC (Peru) (on file with author), § 2.5.1(a) (quoting EDUARDO FERRER MAC-
GREGOR, JUICIO DE AMPARO E INTERÉS LEGÍTIMO: LA TUTELA DE LOS DERECHOS DIFUSOS Y 
COLECTIVOS 16 (2003)) (“La sentencia respectiva surtirá efectos respecto de ‘todos los demás 
integrantes de la colectividad que se encuentren en una posición idéntica al que ejercitó la acción 
correspondiente.’ . . . Los efectos de la decisión, por lo tanto, van más allá de la persona o grupo que 
presentó la demanda.”); see also Trib. Const., Mar. 20, 2009, [Viuda de Mariátegui v. S.U.N.A.T. & 
T.F., S.A.], Exp. No. 04878-2008-PA/TC (Trib. Const.) (Peru) (on file with author), § 2.5.1(a). 
142 L. 472 art. 1 (Colom.) (1998) (“La presente ley tiene por objeto regular las acciones 
populares y las acciones de grupo de que trata el artículo 88 de la Constitución Política de 
Colombia.”). 
143 Id. art. 2 (“Son los medios procesales para la protección de los derechos e intereses 
colectivos.”). 
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Pursuant to the statute, these suits “may be lodged to prevent potential 
harm, to stop a danger, threat, violation, or prejudice vis-à-vis collective 
rights and interests, or to reestablish the status quo ante.”144 Any person, 
legal entity, or organization, along with the Public Ministry and relevant 
state agencies and officials, possesses standing to proceed.145 
Statutory Article 35 declares the following regarding the preclusive 
upshot: “The judgment shall constitute res judicata with respect to the 
parties and the public in general.”146 Colombia’s Code of Civil Procedure 
reiterates the point: “The judgment upon popular actions shall constitute 
res judicata erga omnes.”147 
Of course, the ultimate resolution of the suit does not bar the initiation 
of individual litigation to advance an essentially different, non-societal 
claim. Nonetheless, it should head off any future attempt by any otherwise 
qualified suitor judicially to vindicate identical joint entitlements in the 
same dispute. In particular, the state may, through the Public Ministry or 
the responsible administrative authorities, preclude citizens and 
associations from subsequently revisiting the affair in court. 
3. Argentina’s Collective Writ of Protection 
In 1957, the Argentine Supreme Court created a writ of protection for 
the “judicial enforcement of individual rights.”148 As amended in 1994, 
Argentina’s Constitution embraces this mechanism and, significantly, 
authorizes plaintiffs to proceed collectively: 
The individual affected and the Public Defender may pursue this 
action against any kind of discrimination or in defense of rights 
concerning the environment, competition, or consumers, in addition 
to collective rights more generally. So may organizations dedicated 
to these matters. Nonetheless, they must be registered pursuant to a 
law establishing requirements for them and regulating their 
 
 
144 Id. art. 2 (“Las acciones populares se ejercen para evitar el daño contingente, hacer cesar el 
peligro, la amenaza, la vulneración o agravio sobre los derechos e intereses colectivos, o restituir las 
cosas a su estado anterior cuando fuere posible.”). 
145 Id. art. 12. 
146 Id. art. 35 (“La sentencia tendrá efectos de cosa juzgada respecto de las partes y del público 
en general.”). 
147 CD. PRO. CIV art. 332 (Colom.). 
148 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [Ct. Sup.], Dec. 27, 1957, [Siri v. Police 
Commissioner], 239 F.C.S. 459 (Arg.), translated and reprinted in OQUENDO, supra note 9, at 341-45, 
343. 
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operation.149 
Like the already described Uruguayan diffuse-interests suit, the 
Argentine collective writ of protection allows, beyond the authorities and 
private associations, any “individual affected” to launch the complaint. It 
resembles the just reviewed Colombian actions in that it may target any 
type of infringement inflicted upon a collectivity. 
In Halabi v. the National Executive Branch, Argentina’s top tribunal 
defined the contours of this suit. It distinguished, on the one hand, 
“collective rights that relate to individual homogenous interests” from, on 
the other hand, those “that pertain to collective goods.”150 The former boil 
down to what this Article has been denominating ‘aggregated individual 
entitlements,’ while the latter constitute what it has been referring to and 
focusing on as ‘societal entitlements.’151 
Regarding the latter category, the Argentine justices noted that “the 
petition must aim at the safeguard of a collective good, which belongs to 
the entire community and admits neither division nor exclusion.”152 They 
added that the law “concedes extraordinary standing in order to facilitate 
such protection yet not a right of individual appropriation of the good.”153 
In other words, the claimant speaks in the name of the society as a whole 
and its entitlements. 
The majority declared that “an individually exercised procedural claim 
to prevent or to repair an injury to a collective good leads to a decision that 
has effects that attach to the object of the cause of action but that does not 
directly benefit the individual who filed the suit.”154 It thus suggested that 
a firm adjudicative ruling binds anyone who might otherwise litigate the 
same case. Nevertheless, the opinion also implies that the judgment does 
not preclude subsequent, or even simultaneous, individual litigation: “The 
defense of collective rights that pertain to collective goods . . . differs from 
the protection of individual goods, whether pecuniary or not, which call 
 
 
149 CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA NACIÓN ARGENTINA art. 43 (Arg.). 
150 Ct. Supr., Feb. 24, 2009, [Halabi v. the National Executive Branch], H. 270 XLII, ¶  9 (Arg.) 
(hereinafter Halabi) (on file with author) (“derechos . . . de incidencia colectiva que tienen por objeto 
bienes colectivos, y de incidencia colectiva referentes a intereses individuales homogéneos”). 
151 See generally supra Section I.A. 
152 Halabi, H. 270 XLII, ¶ 11 (“En primer lugar, la petición debe tener por objeto la tutela de un 
bien colectivo, lo que ocurre cuando éste pertenece a toda la comunidad, siendo indivisible y no 
admitiendo exclusión alguna.”). 
153 Id. (“[S]e concede una legitimación extraordinaria para reforzar su protección, pero en 
ningún caso existe un derecho de apropiación individual sobre el bien.”). 
154 Id. (“De tal manera, cuando se ejercita en forma individual una pretensión procesal para la 
prevención o reparación del perjuicio causado a un bien colectivo, se obtiene una decisión cuyos 
efectos repercuten sobre el objeto de la causa petendi, pero no hay beneficio directo para el individuo 
que ostenta la legitimación.”). 
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for enforcement by the duly entitled holders.”155 
To recapitulate: In Argentina, a definitive determination on such 
entitlements presumably produces res judicata erga omnes and, 
accordingly, preempts renewed prosecution, even when undertaken by a 
different complainant. If the state, through the Public Defender, initially 
sues for a collective writ with respect to such rights, it bars any other 
nominal party who might subsequently seek to vindicate them in the face 
of the same alleged violation. Obviously, such a situation evokes that of 
the hypothetical. 
4. Mexican Collective Actions on Diffuse Rights 
Mexico’s Federal Code of Civil Procedure, in Article 580(I), provides 
for “collective actions . . . to enforce diffuse . . . rights and interests, 
understood as those held by an indeterminate . . . collectivity of factually . 
. . similarly situated persons.”156 It announces that these suits, in which 
“the rights and interests belong to an indeterminate collectivity, . . . aim at 
legally compelling the defendant to repair the harm to the collectivity 
either by reestablishing the status quo ante or through an alternative 
reparation for the impairment of the collectivity’s rights or interests.”157 
Article 585 entitles various state organs, such as the Federal 
Procurator’s Office for Environmental Protection and the Procurator 
General, and specialized non-profit organizations to sue; but not ordinary 
citizens. In any event, a substantive adjudication should deprive all 
otherwise qualified complainants of their entitlement to litigate. For the 
concession of standing under Article 588(V), for instance, “[t]he matter 
may not have become res judicata as a result of prior litigation.”158 
Likewise, Article 614 declares: “A judgment not subject to appeal shall 
 
 
155 Id. (“Puede afirmarse, pues, que la tutela de los derechos de incidencia colectiva sobre bienes 
colectivos corresponde al Defensor del Pueblo, a las asociaciones y a los afectados, y que ella debe ser 
diferenciada de la protección de los bienes individuales, sean patrimoniales o no, para los cuales hay 
una esfera de disponibilidad en cabeza de su titular.”). 
156 CÓDIGO FEDERAL DE PROCEDIMIENTOS CIVILES art. 580(I) (Mex.) (“[L]as acciones 
colectivas son procedentes para tutelar . . . . [d]erechos e intereses difusos y colectivos, entendidos 
como aquéllos de naturaleza indivisible cuya titularidad corresponde a una colectividad de personas, 
indeterminada o determinable, relacionadas por circunstancias de hecho o de derecho comunes.”). 
157 Id. art. 581(I) (“[De] los derechos e intereses [es] titular . . . una colectividad indeterminada” 
y la acción “tiene por objeto reclamar judicialmente del demandado la reparación del daño causado a 
la colectividad, consistente en la restitución de las cosas al estado que guardaren antes de la afectación, 
o en su caso al cumplimiento sustituto de acuerdo a la afectación de los derechos o intereses de la 
colectividad . . . .”). 
158 Id. art. 588(V) (“[R]equisito[] de procedencia de la legitimación en la causa . . . : Que la 
materia de la litis no haya sido objeto de cosa juzgada en procesos previos.”). 
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have res judicata consequences.”159 Presumably, preclusion occurs even 
when a different suitor represents the group. Otherwise, the judiciary and 
the alleged violator would risk having to face a considerable number of 
identical complaints.160 
In brief, certain Mexican public and private entities may vindicate 
these entitlements and thus bar re-litigation by any statutorily authorized 
litigant. Significantly, the authorities may bring about a similar outcome 
by originally proceeding through the Procurator General or the Federal 
Procurator’s Office for Environmental Protection. In so doing, they would 
manifestly resemble their hypothesized counterparts. 
5. Summation 
Throughout Spanish America, nominal plaintiffs in two societal actions 
satisfy the identity-of-parties requirement for purposes of res judicata and 
may therefore preclude each other, if they represent the same real party in 
interest on a basically identical matter. Along parallel lines, the state may 
generally preempt litigants purporting to stand in for the same larger 
community on comparable claims. Specifically, it may initiate a diffuse-
interests suit in Uruguay or Peru, a constitutional popular action in 
Colombia, a collective-protection petition in Argentina, or a collective 
action on diffuse rights in Mexico and, upon obtaining a judgment 
amenable to no further appeal or collateral attack, bar private suitors who 
may subsequently attempt to reignite the controversy. 
E. Wrap-Up 
In the United States, Brazil, and Spanish America, res judicata focuses 
on the real party in interest in societal-rights controversies. Consequently, 
one representative of the society at large in court may preclude another 
one. In particular, the state may, upon assuming such a representation, bar 
any otherwise qualified plaintiff from relitigating the case. While the 
denominations and details of the suits vary from one jurisdiction to the 
next, the general approach is fundamentally the same throughout. 
V. LEGITIMATELY SETTLING SOCIETAL CLAIMS 
A. Without Compromising 
 
 
159 Id. art. 614 (“La sentencia no recurrida tendrá efectos de cosa juzgada.”). 
160 See generally supra Section III.D. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss1/5
  
 
 
 
 
2019] DOWN THE FINAL STRETCH 41  
 
 
 
 
In controversies regarding ecological and other societally shared rights, 
perhaps more so than those relating to individual entitlements, the 
contenders seldom go to trial and very often conciliate. As to the United 
States, Courtney R. McVean and Justin R. Pidot declare: “Settlements . . . 
have come to dominate the resolution of legal disputes. . . . Based on the 
high volume of environmental litigation, it comes as no surprise that many 
cases in this context settle as well.”161 Indeed, all of the parens patriae 
adjudications mentioned in Subsection IV.B.3 unfolded in this area and 
wound up with a consent decree.162 In general, Mario F. Valls observes 
that the “conciliation and the settlement of the interests of parties who 
seek to exercise rights over a common good such as the environment” 
characterize environmental law.163 From Brazil, Sílvia Cappelli 
consistently reports that, due to the uncertainty, rigidness, slow pace, and 
elevated cost of litigation, the Public Ministry normally prefers out-of-
court solutions on collectively endured injuries to the environment and 
actually embarks upon such a course 70% of the time.164 
The community’s representatives and, especially, its elected officials 
should have the authority to conciliate as part of their power to vindicate 
communal freedoms. Deprived of the option to settle, they would be 
unable to uphold the underlying entitlements in most cases, which could 
not feasibly or realistically come to an adjudication on substance. In the 
United States, some provisions that authorize societal complaints, such as 
in equitable class-actions or parens patriae suits under the 1914 Clayton 
Anti-Trust Act, themselves envisage the prospect of conciliation and call 
for judicial supervision thereof.165 In Brazil and Colombia, the main 
statute on the entitlements at stake facilitates settlement through regulation 
of some of the procedural particulars.166 
 
 
161 Courtney R. McVean & Justin R. Pidot, Environmental Settlements and Administrative Law, 
39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191, 201-02 (2015). 
162 See supra Section IV.B.3. 
163 MARIO F. VALLS, MANUAL DE DERECHO AMBIENTAL 107-08 (2001) (on file with author) 
(“El derecho ambiental [s]e caracteriza por ser . . . [c]onciliador y transaccional entre los intereses de 
las partes que pretenden ejercer derechos sobre un bien común como es el ambiente.”). 
164 Sílvia Cappelli, El Ministerio Público Fiscal y la protección ambiental, in QUINTO 
PROGRAMA REGIONAL DE CAPACITACIÓN EN DERECHO Y POLÍTICAS AMBIENTALES (Programa de las 
Naciones Unidas para el Medio Ambiente) 177, 190 (2010) (on file with author). 
165 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (“The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled, 
voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.”); 15 U.S.C. § 15c(c) (2018) 
(“An action under subsection (a)(1) shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the 
court, and notice of any proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given in such manner as the court 
directs.”). 
166 See L. 7347 art. 5, § 6 (Braz.) (1985), amended by L. 8078 (Braz.) (1990); L. 472 art. 61 
(1998) (Colom.); see also CD. PRO. CIV. art. 174(III) (Braz.) (“A União, os Estados, o Distrito Federal 
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All the same, a conciliating approach may seem to devalue such 
collectively scoped rights and to condone their abridgement for a fee or 
quick fix. As a result, it may appear to run counter to their characterization 
as inalienable or non-disposable, particularly in Latin America.167 Upon 
deeper inspection, however, this inalienability or non-disposability must 
merely mean that one may not renounce the right at issue or consent to an 
infringement. The government or any other nominal claimant may only 
seek vindication, whether by litigating or settling for suitable 
satisfaction—equivalent to the expected adjudicative relief discounted by 
the costs and risks of litigation. 
Fernando Grella Vieira explains exactly how, under Brazilian law, the 
state or another litigant with standing may legitimately strive for a 
conciliation of controversies concerning these group entitlements. He 
points out that, by providing for a so-called “commitment on the 
adjustment of conduct,” the Public Civil Action Act permits suits on these 
inalienable rights to settle.168 The author elucidates that “the inalienability 
of the exercised entitlements” survives thus: “The commitment must 
contemplate and may, in no way, restrict the claim that the public civil 
action would have staked.”169 By conciliating, the community’s 
representatives implement the right under consideration without retreating 
on or relinquishing it. 
Convergently, Humberto Dalla avers “that a substantive right’s 
inalienable nature . . . does not absolutely hamper procedural conciliation 
so long as a thorough vindication and guaranty remain feasible.”170 He 
adds that “even though those entitled to proceed may not compromise on 
an essentially communal right, they may give in on, say, an accessory or 
 
 
e os Municípios criarão câmaras de mediação e conciliação, com atribuições relacionadas à solução 
consensual de conflitos no âmbito administrativo, tais como . . . promover, quando couber, a 
celebração de termo de ajustamento de conduta.”). 
167 See, e.g., CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR 2008 [CONST.] art. 11(6) 
(Ecuador) (“All of these principles and rights are inalienable, non-waivable, indivisible, 
interdependent, and equally ranked.”) (“Todos los principios y los derechos son inalienables, 
irrenunciables, indivisibles, interdependientes y de igual jerarquía.”). 
168 Fernando Grella Vieira, A Transação na Esfera da Tutela dos Interesses Difusos e Coletivos: 
Compromisso de Ajustamento de Conduta 16 (originally published in A AÇÃO CIVIL PÚBLICA: LEI 
7.347/85 - 15 ANOS 221-249 (Édis Milaré, ed., 2001)) (on file with author) (“O ‘compromisso de 
ajustamento de conduta,’ admitido pelo referido preceito, encerra transação, uma vez que se destina a 
evitar ou por fim ao litígio.”). 
169 Id. at 33-34 (“A mesma pretensão que seria objeto do pedido na ação civil pública, deverá 
estar contemplada no compromisso, não podendo, em nada, ser restringida.”). 
170 HUMBERTO DALLA, JURISDIÇÃO E PACIFICAÇÃO: LIMITES E POSSIBILIDADES DO USO DOS 
MEIOS CONSENSUAIS DE RESOLUÇÃO DE CONFLITOS NA TUTELA DOS DIREITOS TRANSINDIVIDUAIS E 
PLURI-INDIVIDUAIS 190 (2017) (“Deve-se notar, ademais, que o caráter indisponível de um direito 
substancial . . . não representará, por si, um óbice absoluto à convenção processual, desde que por 
meio dela não se produza prejuízo ao direito vindicado em juízo ou à sua tutela.”). 
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even principal obligation unrelated to the nucleus of the central duty.”171 
Embracing “the aspirations for an adequate collective system,” this 
commentator argues in favor of “a minimal margin of negotiation 
necessary for effective settlement” and against “the maintenance of the 
omnipotent dogma pertaining to the utter inalienability of the materially 
joint right.”172 
In its opinion C-215-99, the Colombian Constitutional Court expressly 
endorsed the possibility of conciliation in these suits. It confronted an 
unconstitutionality action against the Law on Popular and Group Actions 
for, inter alia, countenancing a “compliance agreement.” The justices 
concluded that “the compliance agreement’s purpose comport[ed] with 
[the national] constitutional order and, in particular, advance[d] the 
principles of efficiency, economy, promptness. . . .”173 They elaborated on 
their holding: 
In fact, the compliance agreement’s objective consists in allowing 
the parties, upon the judge’s convocation, to reach a voluntary 
agreement to bring about a timely restitution for and a reparation of 
the damage inflicted upon collective rights and interests. Therefore, 
an early termination of the litigation and resolution of the conflict 
come about, along with a reduction of the pressure on the judicial 
apparatus.174 
Hence, the tribunal practically encouraged the settlement of these claims. 
Colombia’s Constitutional Court rejected the contention that by settling 
these suits, plaintiffs were “negotiating away the legal sanction” and 
foiling “the popular actions’ efficacy”: 
On the contrary, such a compliance agreement helps, on the basis of 
 
 
171 Id. at 178 (“A partir dessa ideia então, mesmo um legitimado não podendo abrir mão de um 
direito essencialmente coletivo, não haveria óbice à renúncia de, por exemplo, uma obrigação 
assessória ou até mesmo principal, se não se referir ao núcleo do dever central.”). 
172 Id. at 177 (“Assim sendo, entendemos que atualmente é prejudicial a manutenção do dogma 
onipotente sobre a indisponibilidade absoluta do direito material coletivo, afastando um mínimo de 
margem negocial necessário para a efetivação da avença. A superação dessa linha de pensamento, 
então, parece imprescindível para serem atendidos os anseios por um sistema coletivo adequado.”). 
173 Corte Constitucional de Colombia, Apr. 14, 1999, C-215-99 44 (Colom.) (“[L]a finalidad del 
pacto de cumplimiento encaja dentro del ordenamiento constitucional y, en particular, hace efectivos 
los principios de eficacia, economía y celeridad. . . .”). 
174 Id. (“En efecto, el objetivo que persigue ese pacto es, previa la convocatoria del juez, que las 
partes puedan llegar a un acuerdo de voluntades para obtener el oportuno restablecimiento y 
reparación de los perjuicios ocasionados a los derechos e intereses colectivos, dando con ello una 
terminación anticipada al proceso y solución de un conflicto y por ende, un menor desgaste para el 
aparato judicial.”). 
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consensus, to secure prompt redress of the inflicted damage. It 
accordingly reduces the time needed to end the suit and to arrive at 
a decision by the judge. . . . Similarly, the commitment undertaken 
by the parties and incorporated into the draft of the agreement seeks 
to foresee any possible violation of joint interests and to achieve 
effective protection and reparation.175 
These arguments purport to dispose of the allegation that conciliatory 
litigants somehow impinge upon, or fail to do justice to, an inalienable 
entitlement. 
Nonetheless, the majority added this somewhat confusing qualification: 
We cannot concede to the judgment that approves the compliance 
agreement an absolute res judicata effect. To do so would amount to 
disregarding . . . the rights of people who had no opportunity to 
intervene in the conciliation and who in the future . . . might face a 
new violation of the conciliatorily vindicated rights.176 
The justices were apparently refusing to encumber another suit upon a 
fresh and dissimilar infringement. They subsequently took pains to make 
their meaning clear, supplying their own italics: 
The question raised refers specifically to the emergence within the 
same community of new facts. The new facts would imply an 
encroachment upon the group rights and interests dealt with in the 
compliance agreement. Further, they would relate to causes 
different from those formerly alleged and to the appearance of 
technical information not available to the judge or the parties during 
the compliance agreement.177 
 
 
175 Id. at 45 (“Por el contrario, ese acuerdo contribuye a obtener la pronta reparación de los 
perjuicios ocasionados por la vía de la concertación, reduciendo los términos del proceso y en 
consecuencia, de la decisión que debe adoptar el juez, todo ello, en desarrollo de los principios 
constitucionales ya enunciados. De igual forma, mediante el compromiso que suscriben las partes y 
que se consigna en el proyecto de pacto, se busca prever oportunamente la violación de los intereses 
colectivos, y por consiguiente, su efectiva protección y reparación.”). 
176 Id. at 46 (“No obstante, encuentra la Corte, que cuando se trata de la protección de derechos e 
intereses colectivos, no puede concederse a la sentencia que aprueba el pacto de cumplimiento el 
alcance de cosa juzgada absoluta, pues de ser así se desconocerían el debido proceso, el derecho de 
acceso a la justicia y la efectividad de los derechos de las personas que no tuvieron la oportunidad de 
intervenir en esa conciliación y que en un futuro como miembros de la misma comunidad, se vieran 
enfrentadas a una nueva vulneración de los derechos sobre cuya protección versó la conciliación.”). 
177 Id. (“El interrogante planteado, se refiere en particular, a la ocurrencia en la misma 
comunidad de nuevos hechos que atentan contra los derechos e intereses colectivos objeto del pacto de 
cumplimiento, que en esta ocasión obedecen a causas distintas a las alegadas entonces y a la aparición 
de informaciones de carácter técnicos de las cuales no dispusieron ni el juez ni las partes al momento 
de conciliar la controversia.”). 
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All in all, this passage suggests that preclusion does apply if the second 
dispute involves identical facts and causes. It should have clarified that a 
subsequent suitor may escape a preclusive ban exclusively by bringing 
forward previously unavailable “technical information” that would enable 
her to press a hitherto unasserted claim. 
Citing the Restatement of Judgments, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
pertinently noted “that development of new material facts can mean that a 
new case and an otherwise similar previous case do not present the same 
claim.”178 It has emphasized that when “new evidence presented by [a 
complainant] give[s] rise to a new claim. . . , [his or her newly articulated] 
challenges are not precluded.”179 When the claim, or the object and cause, 
do not change, however, the prior suit does entail a res judicata bar. 
In short, a satisfactory settlement neither undercuts nor undermines 
societal entitlements. Instead, it vindicates them. In this scenario, 
representatives require less time and expense to move the violator to 
restitute or compensate upon an impingement. Consequently, they may 
yield some on the total value of the anticipated adjudicative recovery and 
still come out ahead. 
B. On Behalf of the Citizenry 
Correspondingly, societal settlements may seem to involve someone 
illegitimately contracting away someone else’s entitlement. Nonetheless 
and as previously suggested, they actually enable a community to 
vindicate its own rights by means of representation.180 U.S. and Latin 
American jurisdictions have embraced this perspective to the extent that 
they not merely allow the antecedent suit to conciliate but additionally 
facilitate the process. 
As shown below, civil codes typically contain a detailed regulation of 
conciliation resembling that developed in U.S. case law. Although they 
expectedly focus on disputes in which an individual settles, they may 
apply, if appropriately construed, to those in which a population reaches a 
settlement through a representative. Such an appropriate construal would 
have to rest on the notion that the person or entity seeking to do justice to 
the allegedly infringed-upon entitlements is representing the group, which, 
in turn, constitutes the true party to the transaction.181 
 
 
178 Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2305 (2016). 
179 Id. at 2306. 
180 See generally supra Sections I.A and III.D. 
181 See generally supra Part III. 
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Under this interpretation, the rules at issue would control the 
conciliating of any case, whether individual or collective. In addition, they 
would cohere with statutes that provide for the conciliation, as well as 
prosecution, of societal actions in countries such as the United States, 
Brazil, or Colombia.182 For purposes of illustration, the discussion will 
now concentrate on the Chilean Civil Code’s relevant Title XL,183 which 
partly derives from its French precursor and has equivalents across Latin 
America.184 
First, Article 2452 of this enactment may appear to prevent these meta-
individual suits from settling.185 After all, it resoundingly rejects 
“settlements of the rights of others.”186 In the concerned controversies, 
however, the society at large ultimately conciliates claims based on its 
own entitlements, though by way of representation. 
The representatives, as such, are not and should not be acting on their 
own behalf. If they were, they would be illegally pursuing a conciliation of 
assertions grounded on another’s entitlements. The rights at stake belong 
not to any citizen in particular, or to the government, but instead to the 
citizenry in its entirety. They differ from their individual counterparts.187 
Article 2461 invites a reading along parallel lines, rather than through 
an individualistic prism.188 It proclaims: “Settlements have no effect 
except between the contracting parties.”189 Once again, the collectivity 
plays the role of the contractor on the claimant’s side. To be sure, it 
necessarily participates in the agreement through someone who represents 
it.190 Nevertheless, the latter simply stands in for the former. She neither 
negotiates pro se nor enters herself into the contract. As a result, the 
contractually granted entitlements profit, and the correlatively imposed 
obligations bind, exclusively the group itself on its end of the deal. 
Finally, Article 2447 declares: “Only the person who has the objects of 
settlement at his disposal may settle.”191 Under the submitted construction, 
it means juridical, as well as natural, persons and entitles them to exercise 
 
 
182 See supra Section V.A. 
183 See CD. CIV. (Chile) arts. 2446-2464 (Chile) (“Título XL: De la transacción”). 
184 See CD. CIV. arts. 2044-2058 (Fr.) (“Titre XV: Des transactions”); CD. CIV. arts. 840-850 
(Braz.) (“Capítulo XIX: Da transação”); CD. CIV. arts. 2469-2487 (Colom.) (“Título XXXIX: De la 
transacción”). 
185 CD. CIV. art. 2452 (Chile). 
186 Id. (“No vale la transacción sobre derechos ajenos o sobre derechos que no existen.”). 
187 See generally supra Section I.A. 
188 See CD. CIV. art. 2461 (Chile). 
189 Id. (“La transacción no surte efecto sino entre los contratantes.”). 
190 See generally supra Section I.A. 
191 See CD. CIV. art. 2447 (Chile) (“No puede transigir sino la persona capaz de disponer de los 
objetos comprendidos en la transacción.”). 
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control over such “objects” either (1) directly or (2) through someone else. 
In societal-rights cases, the second type of exercise takes place. In the 
ultimate analysis, the people as a whole own the damaged property and 
hold the entitlements encroached upon but must rely on representation 
throughout. They therefore procure a conciliation through public or private 
representatives in order to repair the damage and attain vindication. 
When the nominal plaintiff speaking in the name of the populace 
conciliates properly, she comports with these civil-law norms, as well as 
their U.S. common-law equivalents. The latter similarly require any 
contract generally to affect no rights of third parties,192 to benefit or burden 
solely the contractors,193 and to deal with goods at the parties’ disposal.194 
They call for a similar interpretative approach in the context at hand. 
All in all, the conciliations under consideration empower, rather than 
disempower, the general public. They permit it to safeguard its 
entitlements extra-judicially. A representative may not undersell, let alone 
appropriate, the interests entrusted to her. Instead, she must uphold them 
throughout the negotiations up to the execution of the agreement and 
beyond.195 
 
VI. GOVERNMENT FOR THE PEOPLE 
The modern state purports to promote the public interest, i.e., the well-
being of its subjects. Hence, the U.S. Constitution enunciates: “The 
Congress shall have Power To . . . provide for the . . . general Welfare of 
the United States . . . .”196 To this end, the government must “formulate, 
execute, evaluate, and control public policy,”197 in the articulation of 
 
 
192 See United States v. Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1352 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980) (Gee, J., dissenting) (“In 
a head-to-head tort or contract case the rights of third parties are not implicated; the parties may 
bargain away their own rights for whatever reasons they may choose.”). 
193 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. ex rel. Brown v. United States, 838 F.3d 1341, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) (“It is well-settled that a party cannot step into the shoes of another party to pursue a contract 
claim absent explicit assignment of the claim or assignment by operation of law under equitable 
subrogation.”). 
194 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 544, 550 (1873) (“No one in general can sell personal 
property and convey a valid title to it unless he is the owner or lawfully represents the owner. Nemo 
dat quod non habet.”); Washington v. Ogden, 66 U.S. 450, 456 (1862) (“The legal effect of a covenant 
to sell is, that the land shall be conveyed by a deed from one who has a good title, or full power to 
convey a good title.”). 
195 See generally supra Section V.A. 
196 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
197 CONST. art. 85(3) (Ecuador) (“formulación, ejecución, evaluación y control de las políticas 
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Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution. The same charter charges the Executive 
Branch, expressly, with the “administration, planning, execution, and 
evaluation of national public policy.”198 It additionally states that “public 
policy must focus on advancing the well-being and enforcing the rights of 
all” and, more controversially, that “the general interest” must prevail 
“over individual interests.”199 
In their efforts on behalf of the common weal, the authorities often 
must, as one of their primary constitutional obligations, strive to conserve 
ecological and other amply shared goods for the benefit of the citizenry. 
They normally implement their policy through administrative action and 
through litigation.200 In this manner, the government arguably assures 
societal priorities and entitlements, i.e., not those of some individuals but 
rather those of society as a whole. 
The U.S. legal system deploys the previously quoted Latin phrase 
parens patriae to refer to this official engagement. The Supreme Court has 
declared: “Parens patriae means literally ‘parent of the country.’”201 It has 
held that this “concept does not involve the State’s stepping in to represent 
the interests of particular citizens who, for whatever reason, cannot 
represent themselves.”202 The justices have insisted that the government 
advances, instead, its “[q]uasi-sovereign interests . . . in the well-being of 
its populace,”203 as opposed to “sovereign interests, proprietary interests, 
or private interests pursued by the State as a nominal party.”204 In Georgia 
v. Tenn. Copper Co., Oliver Wendell Holmes famously framed the quasi-
sovereign interest in the environment: “[T]he state has an interest 
independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air 
within its domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be 
stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”205 
Needless to say, this precise parens patriae doctrine, with its manifold 
details, applies solely in the United States. Nonetheless, it generally 
corresponds to the formerly discussed, recurrent determination to entrust 
 
 
públicas”). 
198 Id. art. 141 (“rectoría, planificación, ejecución y evaluación de las políticas públicas 
nacionales”). 
199 Id. art. 85(1) (“Las políticas públicas . . . se orientarán a hacer efectivos el buen vivir y todos 
los derechos.”); id. art. 85(2) (“prevalencia del interés general sobre el interés particular”). 
200 See, e.g., Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120, 123 (2012) (“If the EPA [Environmental Protection 
Agency] determines that any person is in violation of [the Clean Water Act’s] restriction [on the 
pollution of navigable waters], the Act directs the Agency either to issue a compliance order or to 
initiate a civil enforcement action.”). 
201 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982). 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 602. 
204 Id. 
205 Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907). 
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the government with the community’s concerns and with the 
representation of the entire population. In this day and age, authorities all 
around may and must adopt measures and engage themselves, in and out 
of court, in favor not of a few persons but of the polity in itself. 
In his plurality opinion in Luján v. Defenders of Wildlife, Antonin 
Scalia went so far as to insinuate that the political governmental branches 
possess the prerogative to look after the communal welfare. He wrote: 
“Vindicating the public interest (including the public interest in 
government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of 
Congress and the Chief Executive.”206 Accordingly, he announced a 
decision restricting citizen suits.207 
All the same, suitors who demonstrate the required injury-in-fact can 
still champion what interests the public. The highest U.S. tribunal has 
proclaimed: “The test of injury in fact goes only to the question of 
standing to obtain judicial review. Once this standing is established, the 
party may assert the interests of the general public in support of his claims 
for equitable relief.”208 Similarly, qui tam and class actions have long 
enabled individuals to litigate in the name of the people at large.209 
The civil-law realm has traditionally empowered the citizenry to play 
this role too.210 Latin American codified popular actions present a case in 
point.211 They stem from ancient Rome, i.e., from an era in which the 
population regularly participated, in very specific situations, in the 
safeguard of the public interest.212 For instance, Chile’s current Civil 
Code, originally drafted by Venezuelan Andrés Bello in 1855 and 
immensely influential throughout Latin America,213 incorporates several 
such suits, respectively, (1) to protect the life of unborn children, (2) to 
safeguard the right of way on public roads, (3) to remove objects that may 
hang from buildings and may end up falling on passersby, and (4) to set 
aside an impending harm to which an indeterminate number of potential 
victims may be exposed.214 
 
 
206 Luján v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992). 
207 Id. at 578 (“We hold that respondents lack standing to bring this [citizen suit under the 1973 
Endangered Species Act against the exemption of actions undertaken in foreign nations from statutory 
protections].”). 
208 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 n.15 (1972). 
209 See generally supra Section IV.B. 
210 See generally supra Sections IV.C-D. 
211 See generally supra Parts IV.C.1 and IV.D.2. 
212 See generally supra Section I.A. 
213 See generally OQUENDO, supra note 9, at 453-530 (Ch. VII). 
214 CD. CIV. arts. 75 (Chile) (“El juez . . . tomará, a petición de cualquiera persona o de oficio, 
todas las providencias que le parezcan convenientes para proteger la existencia del no nacido, siempre 
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Relatively recently, many jurisdictions in the Western Hemisphere 
have been gravitating toward authorizing anyone more widely to speak for 
the nation or a subunit thereof, especially through litigation.215 They have 
opted, on this last front, not for narrowly tailored private-law actions but 
rather for broadly based public-law suits.216 As a consequence, the 
challenge of how to achieve coherence when numerous different plaintiffs 
may stand in for the collectivity has emerged or, actually, intensified. Not 
surprisingly, it has driven lawmakers and judges to draw on the principle 
of res judicata as a key part of their response.217 
While the state enjoys no monopoly over societal rights, it may 
certainly enforce them and thereupon preclude other individuals or entities 
with standing. When it prosecutes a group entitlement, citizens may no 
longer do the same on their own. After all, they may proceed merely 
insofar as no prior enforcement has taken place at the hands of another 
litigant eligible to lodge a complaint.218 
Clearly, the authorities ought to stand up for the public interest, 
including that in the environment, and may speak for the citizenry. They 
may demand comprehensive compensation if necessary. Ordinarily, the 
government does not thereby stand in for concerned persons, who 
consequently preserve their right to indemnification for any damage that 
they might have personally undergone.219 
To be sure, state officials everywhere must exert themselves to 
represent the populace effectively and fairly. In the process, they should 
wisely develop policies and conduct litigation so as to further, to the 
utmost, what interests the public. At any rate, as the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit persuasively posited in closing a passage of Alaska 
Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp. reproduced earlier, “There is a 
 
 
que crea que de algún modo peligra.”); id. art. 948 (“La municipalidad y cualquiera persona del pueblo 
tendrá, en favor de los caminos, plazas u otros lugares de uso público, y para la seguridad de los que 
transitan por ellos, los derechos concedidos a los dueños de heredades o edificios privados.”); id. art. 
2328 (“Si hubiere alguna cosa que, de la parte superior de un edificio o de otro paraje elevado, 
amenace caída y daño, podrá ser obligado a removerla el dueño del edificio o del sitio, o su inquilino, 
o la persona a quien perteneciere la cosa o que se sirviere de ella; y cualquiera del pueblo tendrá 
derecho para pedir la remoción.”); id. art. 2333 (“Por regla general, se concede acción popular en 
todos los casos de daño contingente que por imprudencia o negligencia de alguien amenace a personas 
indeterminadas.”); see also CD. CIV. arts. 91, 1005, 2355, 2359 (Colom.) (same, respectively); CD. 
CIV. arts. 61, 990, 2228, 2236 (Ecuador) (same, respectively). The Panamanian Civil Code, in turn, 
authorizes popular actions to enforce the ban on the exaction of compound interests and to remove or 
alter, as well as to recover damages caused by, a construction obstructing a public way. 625. CD. CIV. 
arts. 994-A, 625 (Pan.). 
215 See generally supra Part IV. 
216 See generally supra Part IV. 
217 See generally supra Part IV. 
218 See generally supra Part IV. 
219 See generally supra Part IV. 
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presumption that the state will adequately represent the position of its 
citizens.”220 
The population, in turn, has every right to expect a vigorous 
governmental defense of its collective and environmental well-being. It 
may also utilize an ample assortment of mechanisms to monitor and to 
check its representatives, as well as to rebut the presumed representative 
adequacy. For instance, the U.S. Constitution invites anybody “to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances.”221 It thus calls to mind its 
counterparts south of the border,222 as well as the American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of Man.223 
Furthermore, anyone immediately impacted by an administrative 
settlement throughout the Americas could presumably attack it before a 
tribunal. In the United States, for example, she might rely on Section 702 
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which reads: “A person 
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or 
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is 
entitled to judicial review thereof.”224 In Colombia, Article 86 of the Code 
of Administrative Procedure might, likewise, show the way: “An 
interested person may directly sue for the reparation of a harm caused by 
an administrative action, omission, [or] operation . . . .”225 
In addition, individuals may usually challenge any ensuing 
infringements upon their constitutional entitlements. In the United States, 
they may contest, pursuant to the top tribunal’s holding in Martin v. Wilks, 
any consent decree that encroaches upon their rights under the 
Constitution.226 In Latin America, they may file for a writ of protection 
 
 
220 34 F.3d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam); see supra Section IV.B.3. 
221 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
222 See, e.g., CONST. art. 8 (Mex.) (“Los funcionarios y empleados públicos respetarán el 
ejercicio del derecho de petición, siempre que ésta se formule por escrito, de manera pacífica y 
respetuosa; pero en materia política sólo podrán hacer uso de ese derecho los ciudadanos de la 
República.”). 
223 See American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. XXIV, May 2, 1948, O.A.S. 
Res. XXX, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, 
OEA/Serv.L.V./II.82, doc. 6, rev. 1 (1992) (“Every person has the right to submit respectful petitions 
to any competent authority, for reasons of either general or private interest, and the right to obtain a 
prompt decision thereon.”). 
224 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018). 
225 DECR. 1, CD. CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO art. 87 (Colom.) (1984) (“La persona 
interesada podrá demandar directamente la reparación del daño cuando la causa sea un hecho, una 
omisión, una operación administrativa . . . .”); see also L. 35 art. 1 (Ecuador) (1968) (“El recurso 
contencioso-administrativo puede interponerse por las personas naturales o jurídicas contra los 
reglamentos, actos y resoluciones de la Administración Pública o de las personas jurídicas 
semipúblicas, que causen estado, y vulneren un derecho o interés directo del demandante.”). 
226 Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 758 (1989) (“A group of white firefighters [may challenge] 
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against any official action that impinges upon their entitlements.227 This 
special, summary procedural device serves to address the dispute at hand, 
without setting a precedent, and to secure fast and effective satisfaction.228 
Finally, people with societal standing would have strong grounds for 
intervention before any forum in which the local administration were 
endeavoring to conciliate or to validate a conciliation for the profit of the 
society. In an analogous vein, they would probably face favorable odds if 
they sought some kind of a say in any governmental extra-judicial 
negotiations with an alleged violator. A threat to litigate could further 
improve the chances in this effort to exert influence. 
As soon as the contract settling the controversy becomes final and 
attains any needed court-validation, however, citizens may no longer 
intervene or weigh in along these lines. Moreover, they then lose their 
right to institute a suit on the same group claim. A fortiori, a private 
litigant may not attempt the vindication all over again of the rights that the 
authorities have already completely vindicated on the matter.229 
In sum, the government does not, when negotiating and signing such a 
settlement, purely propel its own particular commercial, contractual, 
financial, fiscal, pecuniary, or proprietary interests. Instead, it acts, as it 
frequently, prototypically, and principally does, in pursuit of the prosperity 
of its subjects. The moment the agreement amounts to res judicata, no one 
else may file or refile the cause. 
In the hypothetical, the state specifically enforces the community’s 
environmental right against any violations attributable to the manufacturer. 
Upon conciliating and procuring any requisite judicial endorsement, it 
legally and legitimately binds itself and anyone else trying to uphold the 
entitlement against the same encroachments. Thereafter, victims may 
exclusively exercise their own substantive individual right to 
compensation for any personal loss that they might have experienced. 
They may not launch the precedingly averted litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
Societal suits, particularly when lodged by a non-governmental litigant, 
 
 
promotion decisions on the basis of race in reliance on certain consent decrees, and [allege] that these 
decisions constituted impermissible racial discrimination in violation of the Constitution . . . .”); see 
also id. at 762 (“A judgment or decree among parties to a lawsuit resolves issues as among them, but it 
does not conclude the rights of strangers to those proceedings.”). 
227 See supra Sections IV.D.1 (Reference to Peru’s Writ of Protection) and IV.D.3 (Reference to 
Argentina’s Writ of Protection); see generally OQUENDO, supra note 9, at 307-380 (Ch. V). 
228 See generally OQUENDO, supra note 9, at 307-380 (Ch. V). 
229 See generally supra Part II. 
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may generate considerable controversy. They could even fall prey to wide-
ranging campaigns against a perceived culture of excessive litigiousness. 
The United States sometimes seems to provide cases in point. It has 
occasionally seen citizen suitors and class-action complainants constrained 
by case law and legislation apparently in this spirit.230 Interestingly, other 
countries in the hemisphere, or the world, appear not to confront this 
phenomenon as much. Maybe they eventually will, whether through U.S. 
influence or by growing in distrust of the legal establishment and of 
litigation on their own. 
In any event, the failure to take res judicata seriously might fire up any 
pre-existing hostility against collective actions. It might lead to, or 
intensify, the temptation to view them as superfluous or frivolous. Indeed, 
superfluity and frivolity would seem to pervade any complaint on a 
previously staked claim, especially upon a favorable outcome the first time 
around. 
Consequently, the supra-individual lawsuits at issue should strengthen, 
rather than weaken, from a punctilious adherence to the principle of 
preclusion. They should thereby end up reassuring the citizenry that they 
will not vouchsafe the claimant a windfall, unfold unfairly against the 
defendant, or spawn juridical inefficiency. Any potential plaintiff would, 
in turn, appreciate that she may truly have the first and last word. 
This Article launched from these convictions. To guide the analysis, it 
initially (I) clarified the nomenclature and proffered a concrete 
hypothetical. The discussion then (II) distinguished the adjective 
implications of a societal settlement that has enjoyed any requisite judicial 
endorsement from their contractual counterparts. It thereupon (III) 
elucidated them from a common- and civil-law perspective, as well as 
from that of the overarching idea of res judicata. 
Part IV examined how jurisdictions across the Americas have decided 
these matters in practice. Next, Part V showed that settlers need neither 
compromise on the undergirding entitlements nor contract on the rights of 
someone else. Finally, Part VI explored how the government might justify 
itself in prosecuting, or settling on, any such entitlement. 
At the end of the day, the preclusive ramifications define and legitimate 
the vindication, whether private or public, of the right at stake. For 
starters, they not only circumscribe but also outline and illuminate it, 
delineating as well as delimiting in the manner of a circle’s circumference. 
 
 
230 See, e.g., Luján v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
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After all, “[s]omething is what it is within, and by virtue of, its 
boundary.”231 More importantly, the underlying act of representation 
maintains, beyond its character as such, its very legitimacy by honoring 
these procedural parameters for its exercise.232 
 
 
 
231 GEORG W.F. HEGEL, ENZYKLOPÄDIE DER PHILOSOPHISCHEN WISSENSCHAFTEN I (1830), 
reprinted in 8 G.W.F. HEGEL WERKE 197 (§ 192 Zusatz) (1970) (“Etwas ist nur in seiner Grenze und 
durch seine Grenze das, was es ist.”). 
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